THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE IN POPULAR MOBILIZATION

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A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Government
University of Essex

October 2023

Abstract

This thesis delves into the issue of violence in popular mobilisation through three journal-style articles, each addressing an interrelated research question. The first study offers a nuanced exploration of the relationship between the types of targets protesters choose and the subsequent state responses, emphasizing the consequences of attacks on government-related argets and individuals. Leveraging data from social conflicts in Africa spanning 2000 to 2017, this paper argues that the increased hostility and resolve of demonstrators can alter state actors' perceptions of threat from them. The second paper focuses on the perplexing instances of protester violence from the perspective of the actors involved. It suggests that the choice of violent tactics hinges largely on actors' mobilisation capabilities and organisational structures, substantiated by an analysis of African anti-government protests and further clarified by a comparative case study. The third study provides a gender-centric perspective on resistance strategies, emphasizing the pivotal role female participation plays in influencing a movement's inclination towards violence. With data from NAVCO 2.1 and a case study from Cote d'Ivoire, this article underscores the gender-specific considerations in strategy selection. Collectively, these papers augment our comprehension of violent protest dynamics, presenting crucial insights for both scholars and policymakers tasked with navigating the complexities of political activism.

For all the ongoing and future social struggles

Acknowledgement

First and foremost, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisors: Professor Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Dr. Sara M.T. Polo; Professor Reed Wood, and Dr. Howard Liu as board members. I am also immensely grateful to every mentor from the Department of Government, everyone in our PhD community, my families and my friends.

And you played a crucial role in helping me achieve this significant milestone, and I couldn't have done it without your unwavering support. Thank you for standing by my side.

Last but certainly not least, I extend my sincere thanks to myself for the hard work and determination I invested in this journey. Starting a PhD during a pandemic, studying abroad as an international student from the Global South, and being a woman in academia has not been easy. However, I am grateful that I have never been alone.

All errors and faults are my own.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

This dissertation examines instances of violence within nonviolent conflicts. In recent years, disruptive and extreme behaviors displayed by protesters have garnered the attention of policy-makers, social activists, and the media. This trend is puzzling, as the success of social movements often hinges on public support. Resorting to violence, which goes against the principles of civil resistance, might compromise the perceived legitimacy of the protests and their underlying motivations (e.g., Simpson, Willer, and Feinberg 2018; Feinberg, Willer, and Kovacheff 2020).

This chapter is an introduction to the dissertation as a whole, providing the context for the three papers, as well as summarizing the most important arguments and findings.

1.1 Rethinking violence in protests

Violence is a common feature of armed conflict and a well-studied topic in the field of peace and conflict studies (e.g., Kalyvas 2006; Balcells 2011; Weintraub 2016). The role of violence in nonviolent struggles has also drawn much attention and discussion in scholarly circles (Case 2018). Much literature that examines violence in protests focuses on the state's use of force against protesters and civilians (e.g., Noakes and Gillham 2016; Reynolds-Stenson 2018; Iwuoha and Aniche 2021) or more subtle forms of coercion like digital surveillance (e.g., Della Porta and Reiter 2010; Hager and Krakowski 2022; Lukito et al. 2022).

The widely accepted definition of violence primarily stems from discourse on civil wars. However, it might be more appropriate to theorize the violence observed in civil wars and civil resistance differently. The distinction between violence in these two contexts becomes more

apparent when we delve into specific cases. For example, the typical repertoire of violence in armed conflicts includes activities like bombings, shootings, kidnappings (e.g., Ibrahim and Mukhtar 2017; Gilbert 2022), and sexual violence (e.g, Wood 2006; Marks 2014). In the most extreme situations, genocide can occur. As a result, many datasets such as UCDP (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Davis 2021) measure the extent of violence using fatalities.

The analysis in this dissertation focuses on violence committed by protesters. Protesters in social movements are often less armed (Kadivar and Ketchley 2018), with common 'weapons' including Molotov cocktails, sticks, stones, and pigments. Aggressive and violent behaviors are less lethal; they can range from damaging famous paintings, looting businesses, and setting buildings on fire to violently disrupting transportation, robbing shops, and attacking politicians.

Compared to academic efforts focused on violence in armed conflicts, the literature on the study of protest violence is relatively new but rapidly expanding (e.g., Gurr 1989; Seferiades and Johnston 2013; Piven 2016; Sullivan and Davenport 2017; Ives and Lewis 2020). However, measuring violence in civil resistance poses several challenges. First, there is an ongoing debate regarding the distinction between disruption and violence when defining "nonviolent" struggles (Case 2018; Chotiner 2020; Arntsen 2020; Gayle 2023). This debate raises questions such as whether disrupting transportation in an abrasive manner during a peaceful demonstration should be considered violent or not.

Second, the influence of media reporting bias in protests is also substantial (Hocke 1996; Barranco and Wisler 1999). Media bias creates problems in measuring violence in armed conflicts, but it is even more significant for civil resistance, as these movements are less high-profile than wars. Some pro-government media may over-report the violence to discredit political activism (Susánszky, Kopper, and Zsigó 2022), while others may ignore the violence due to empathy toward these movements. These challenges underscore the need for new and in-depth research in this area.

Therefore, this thesis is inspired to delve into the issue of violence in popular mobilization. This line of inquiry is not just an intellectual pursuit but also holds considerable relevance for policymakers. I hope that this thesis can make contributions to these discussions and lay the foundation for future explorations.

1.2 Previous research

Despite the widespread occurrence of violence in protests, the use of violence, especially by protesters, has remained a relatively understudied phenomenon in both quantitative and qualitative terms within existing literature. Often, protester violence is viewed as a reaction to strong repression by state authorities (e.g., Steinert-Threlkeld, Chan, and Joo 2022). Many argue that protesters resort to more disruptive and aggressive actions when they feel they have no other option (Hashempour 2021).

Another common explanation for violence by protesters pertains to the loss of control within the movement itself (e.g., Porta and Tarrow 1986; Nassauer 2019; Ives and Lewis 2020). This loss of control can be triggered by various factors, including abrupt spikes in food prices (Gustafson 2020), mismanagement of the movement's activities (Ives and Lewis 2020), or the chaotic, leaderless nature of some spontaneous efforts (Yuen et al. 2022).

However, there are nuanced effects that merit deeper investigation to enhance our understanding. One aspect worth delving into is the variation in the repertoire of violence, encompassing the diverse tactics and strategies used by protestors or activists to further their objectives. These tactics can span from physical clashes with police or opposing factions to acts of property damage, such as vandalism or arson. They may also include the deployment of weapons or projectiles, or the setting up of barricades and roadblocks. However, in many quantitative studies on nonviolent resistance, such variations are often simply coded as "violent." In addition, while we understand that mismanagement can lead to higher risks of violence, we need a more thorough examination of the possible origins of this mismanagement. For instance, what factors contribute to some nonviolent conflicts being well-organized while others appear more spontaneous? Additionally, conducting more disaggregated research to investigate the backgrounds, previous experiences, and societal identities of those involved is essential to gaining a deeper understanding of these dynamics.

1.3 Motivation: a disaggregated approach

Consequently, this thesis adopts a disaggregated approach to study violence in civil resistance. The disaggregated analysis of violence, especially in the context of armed conflict, has been

gaining attention in recent years (e.g., Cederman and Gleditsch 2009; Ormhaug, Meier, and Hernes 2009; Raleigh et al. 2010; Kalyvas 2012; Fjelde and Hultman 2014). This shift is driven by critiques contending that "most existing studies treat civil war as an aggregate outcome at the state level, neglecting variations within states, among actors, and across regions experiencing conflict" (Cederman and Gleditsch 2009, 487).

From the discussions above, many studies frame the decision to use violence largely as an aggregate outcome, overlooking the micro-dynamics that influence these decisions. For instance, some research (Sawyer and Korotayev 2022) categorizes protest violence based on event typologies, designating riots as an explicitly violent manifestation within the broader landscape of protests. Conversely, actions like strikes, demonstrations, and marches are typically deemed peaceful. Furthermore, while certain studies delve into the concept of escalation, the term "escalation" inherently suggests a growing intensity of violence (Gustafson 2020; Ives and Lewis 2020). These approaches can result in underrepresenting or neglecting violent episodes that sporadically occur even within predominantly peaceful demonstrations. Some studies (Steinert-Threlkeld, Chan, and Joo 2022) have begun rethinking the measurement of violence in protests. Collectively, these insights underscore the need for an in-depth examination of the underlying micro-dynamics.

Some case studies also underscore the need of disaggregating protest violence. An example is the youth-led protests during the anti-India mass uprisings in Indian-administered Kashmir, commonly referred to as the Tehreek (Finnigan 2019). Within these demonstrations, participants chiefly resort to stone-throwing as their principal method of violent expression. This act is not simply a means to voice grievances and respond to confrontations from the Indian police force; it also bears significant symbolic weight in the region. In this setting, stones symbolize courage, solidarity, and resistance (Guroo, Naikoo, et al. 2018; Ganie 2021). An aggregate perspective on violence might overlook intricate micro-dynamics: Why do some protesters choose stone-throwing over hurling Molotov cocktails? Why do certain clashes with security forces escalate into violent confrontations, while others manifest as smashing shop windows to vent frustration?

Disaggregation approaches encourage researchers to tackle research questions by distin-

guishing among different types of violence, examining the specific characteristics of perpetrators and victims, or undertaking subnational analyses, zooming in on finer spatial units (Cederman and Gleditsch 2009). In line with this, this dissertation dissect the violence executed by protesters, particularly focusing on their targets, their identities, and, most crucially, their gender. I have commenced data collection endeavors in pursuit of this objective.

1.4 Key concepts and assumptions

Before providing a summary of the chapters, this section briefly outlines the foundational paradigm that guides this dissertation and provides definitions for key concepts.

Firstly, Kalyvas (2006, 19) defines violence within the context of civil wars as 'the deliberate infliction of harm on people.' However, I assert that within the realm of nonviolent civil resistance, the threshold for designating disruptive behaviours as violent and indiscriminate should be stricter. One reason for this is that the success of nonviolent resistance hinges on its steadfast commitment to "non-violence," which consequently receives wider support (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013). In a way, participants in these movements are subject to elevated ethical standards.

In addition, the participants in these public gatherings will be expected to articulate their demands in line with established laws and regulations. While each country has its specific regulations concerning public processions and assemblies, using the UK as a reference, the Public Order Act 1986[1] (CHAPTER 64) furnishes clear guidelines on violent disorder and public order disrution. Violent disorder involves three or more persons employing or threatening unlawful violence, in such a manner that a reasonably resolute individual present would fear for their safety. The realm of public order offences encompasses the utilization or intimidation of unlawful violence in public places. To illustrate, deliberately and forcefully obstructing traffic could be construed as a public order offence under the Public Order Act 1986. Such actions might be classified under sections addressing the provocation of violence, violent disorder, or the imposition of significant harm upon the public. Engaging in such intentional disruptions,

1. The Public Order Act 1986 (c 64) is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom that delineates various public order offences. It supersedes related common law offences and parts of the Public Order Act 1936, acting upon the recommendations of the Law Commission.

especially when violent, could have legal repercussions.

In light of these considerations, I adopt Tilly et al. (2003)'s definition of violence as "physical harm to individuals and/or property" throughout the chapters. This definition aligns more accurately with my conceptualization of the violent and disruptive tactics employed by protesters.

Secondly, I operate under the premise that non-state actors involved in mass mobilization act rationally, even when resorting to violence (Enos, Kaufman, and Sands 2019). They assess the perceived benefits and drawbacks of their actions, and gravitate towards activities where the benefits seem to outweigh the costs. The emphasis on this premise is crucial because there exists a strand of research that suggests behaviors that could be interpreted as "irrational", being mostly driven by emotions. As Nassauer (2019, 50) points out, "people feel abandoned and attacked, confused and distressed—tensions and fear escalate." However, I maintain that in the context of civil resistance, the primary collective objective of actors is to advance towards a specific political, social, or economic goal (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013), while the minimal goal for an individual is to ensure their own safety. Hence, once non-state actors participate in mass mobilization, they will actively strive to minimize personal costs while seeking to maximize potential concessions from state governments. Even if they engage in violent and disruptive behaviors, they are still operating with rational reasoning and thinking about possible repercussions.

1.5 Overview of the dissertation project

The three papers in the dissertation delve into the complex interplay between violence and protest dynamics. The overarching theme of my dissertation, *The Problem of Violence in Popular Mobilization*, encompasses a trio of distinct yet interconnected papers that together contribute to a holistic understanding of protest strategies, the origins and their outcomes.

The first paper, *Precision in Chaos: The Strategy of Targeted Protest Violence and State Repression*, probes the nuanced relationship between protest violence targets and subsequent state responses. Departing from existing studies that largely focus on the scale and intensity of state repression, this paper homes in on the types of targets protesters choose. It argues that attacks on "hard" targets and individuals trigger more pronounced state repression due to the

demonstrators' heightened hostility and perceived resolve. To test my hypothesis, I collected data on various protest violence targets in social conflicts across 46 African countries from 2000 to 2017. After merging this new dataset with the recorded instances of anti-government protests in Africa from the SCAD database and conducting analysis, I substantiate this hypothesis with strong quantitative evidence, shedding light on when and why specific protest violence forms invite repressive state reactions.

In the second paper, *A Well-Disciplined Nonviolent Militia? Mobilization Experience and Protester Violence*, I delve into the intriguing phenomenon of seemingly unwarranted protester violence in the absence of direct state threats. This paper proposes that the adoption of violent tactics hinges on actors' mobilization capacity and organizational structures. Furthermore, it introduces a new theoretical framework for non-state actors that are unique to the context of social movements. Using actor identity as a proxy, I analyse anti-government protests in Africa from 2000 to 2017, revealing a correlation between violence and actors with limited mobilization resources and informal connections. Additionally, I present a comparative case study involving the April 6 Youth Movement in Egypt and the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia to further explore this mechanism. In essence, this paper illuminates the role of organizational dynamics in shaping protest violence.

The third paper, *Exploring Gender Dynamics in Anti-Government Movements: Shaping the Choice Between Violence and Civil Resistance*, introduces a gender-focused perspective to the study of resistance strategies. Building on literature on social norms and behaviours around gender, I investigate the influence of female engagement on the choice between violent and nonviolent tactics within anti-government movements, and I argue that movements lacking female participation are more likely to resort to violent pathway. Empirical analysis of resistance campaigns recorded in NAVCO 2.1, and a case study of Ivory Coast's 2010-2011 protests validate this hypothesis. This paper contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the role of gender in shaping strategic choices within contentious movements.

Collectively, these papers provide an intricate mosaic of insights into protest violence, state repression, and the interplay of gender dynamics. By scrutinizing the targets of protest violence, unpacking the factors behind protester violence, and unveiling the gender-based influences on

strategic choices, my dissertation offers a multifaceted perspective on the problems of violence in popular mobilization. In doing so, it adds significant value to the existing literature and opens avenues for further research in the micro-dynamic field of political activism. Last but not least, this comprehensive exploration of protest dynamics and their consequences not only deepens scholarly knowledge but also holds implications for policymakers striving to respond effectively to social and political movements.

Chapter 2

Precision in Chaos: the Targeted Protest Violence and State Repression

The various targets of protest violence could influence states' calculations regarding the use of violence. However, previous studies that have considered state repression as a response to protest violence have primarily focused on its scope, magnitude, and intensity, while neglecting to explore the apparent variation in the targets of protest violence. To address this gap, this paper examines the link between soft/hard targets of protest violence and repression. The paper argues that the state is more likely to respond with repression when there are assaults on "hard" targets or attacks on individuals. This is primarily due to the fact that protesters who target government-affiliated entities display less faith in, but greater hostility towards, the authorities. They also signal higher resolve and demonstrate increased resourcefulness. Consequently, the state updates its perception of the severity of the movement and perceives the threat to be at its maximum. To test this hypothesis, the paper leverages new data on protest violence targets in anti-government protests in Africa. The results of quantitative analysis strongly support the expected relationship. This analysis sheds light on the conditions under which specific forms of protest violence are more likely to provoke repressive reactions from states. It also paves the way for future studies on protest violence targeting. Overall, this study contributes to a better understanding of how different targets of protest violence impact states' decisions to employ repression.

2.1 Introduction

How does the violence by dissidents affect the states' reaction in a anti-government protest? Previous studies confirm a positive association between violence by non-state challengers and the use of force by states (Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Carey 2010; Sullivan 2020). And violent unrest within peaceful demonstrations provides state actors with justification to use violence against non-state challengers (Edwards and Arnon 2021). For instance, violence by dissidents erupted in a protest against the incumbent government during the presidential election in Cote d'Ivoire in 2010. Furious citizens stormed and looted local offices and court houses, torched the cars belonging to the government officials. Eventually, the government decided to crack down on this march as a response to the ever-growing anger. Yet, why sometimes the violent behaviours from dissidents may not trigger violent repression? In 2014, thousands of demonstrators celebrate the resignation of President Michel Djotodia in Central Africa Republic. Celebrations deteriorate into looting and sectarian violence (France24 2014), but no flagrant use of force by the state actor was reported.

Why did violent incidents trigger repressive responses in Cote d'Ivoire but not in the Central African Republic? This variation in state responses underscores the diverse impact of violent discontent. It challenges the conventional 'threat-response' approach (Davenport, Johnston, and Mueller 2005). Building on this line of inquiry and aiming to address this intriguing phenomenon, this paper introduces a crucial yet often overlooked aspect: the diverse targets of such violence.

Violent resistance events can involve a diverse range of targets, including both the public and private sectors. Notable cases, such as the 2020 protest against a security law in Paris, where demonstrators constructed impromptu barricades and employed smoke bombs and firecrackers, leading to the injury of an estimated one hundred police officers (Jazeera 2020). Another case was the group of pro-Trump protesters who occupied the Capitol Building and the Republican and Democratic Party headquarters on January 6, 2021, to thwart the certification of Trump's defeat in the elections (Savage 2021). What these attacks have in common is that they directly targeted government-related individuals and properties. Meanwhile, widespread looting of shops and the destruction of business and private property were witnessed during the

End SARS protests in Nigeria (Mbah 2020). Cases like those in Paris, Washington D.C., Abuja and Lagos serve as illustrative examples of such variance. However, the previous literature has not adequately explored this. This motivates the paper to explore the link between the targets of protest violence.

Therefore, I propose explanations for state reactive repression by considering the variation in protest violence targets. First, I argue that the likelihood of repressive responses depends on whether the attacks are directed towards government-affiliated targets such as officials, the police force and public properties. The selection of targets serves as a signaling mechanism. Attackers who pose a direct threat exhibit stronger determination in their political preferences, a reduced reliance on nonviolent principles, resourcefulness, and heightened antagonism towards the authority. Therefore, targeting government-affiliated entities not only reflects a lack of trust in the authorities but also signifies increased hostility and resolve. Such attacks prompt the state to reassess the level of threat and the future trajectory of the nonviolent movement. As a result, the state revises its perception of the risk and perceives it as maximum, leading to a greater inclination towards aggressive responses.

Furthermore, I argue that when compared to causing damage to properties, targeting individuals would heighten the perceived threat level for the state, more likely resulting in a repressive response. There has been ongoing debate and research regarding the sensitivity of state actors to these distinctions. While targeting properties can be economically costly for the government, attacking people represents a direct confrontation and an immediate threat, which differs from actions like blocking streets with fires or smashing store windows.

To test the proposed theoretical expectations, I turned to protest event data from Africa for the period between 2000 and 2017, as sourced from Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) (Salehyan et al. 2012). A thorough examination of major datasets in the literature of popular mobilization reveals a discernible gap in specific data on attack targets. This gap suggests that the potential link between target objects and state reactions might not have been adequately explored in earlier quantitative studies. The SCAD (Salehyan et al. 2012) captures *event escalation*, but might not encompass minor violent confrontations. The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset (Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis 2018) provides

a broad overview of tactical choices. The Mass Mobilization in Autocracies Dataset (MMAD) (Weidmann and Rød 2019) offers insights into the level of violence by mass mobilization participants, but not into the specific targets of that violence. While these datasets are rich in certain aspects, they seem to lack detailed measurements or suitable proxies related to protester violence targets. To address this, I collected new data by hand-coding information derived from news reports, marking a valuable addition to existing knowledge. The subsequent statistical findings support the theoretical expectations, offering insights into situations where specific forms of protest violence are more likely to trigger repressive state actions.

This study contributes in three significant ways. Firstly, it complements the existing theory of state repression in comparative politics (Davenport, Johnston, and Mueller 2005; Hill and Jones 2014; Simpson, Willer, and Feinberg 2018; Nassauer 2018; Poe 2019). While following the threat-response approach, it diverges by incorporating the targets of dissident violence into the analysis of government actions. By considering the specific targets of protest violence, it enhances our understanding of the dynamics between protest movements and governing authorities. This research sheds light on the conditions under which certain forms of protest violence are more likely to provoke repressive reactions, thereby offering valuable insights for future studies in this field.

Secondly, this paper fills a gap in the literature of contentious politics and collective violence. While there is a growing body of research exploring violence by protesters (Seferiades and Johnston 2013; Sullivan 2019; Steinert-Threlkeld, Chan, and Joo 2022), a unified understanding of the underlying logic and the variation in target selection is often lacking. To address this limitation, this study extends the typology of hard and soft targets from the terrorism literature (Polo and Gleditsch 2016) to the domain of protest violence, proposing a disaggregated approach. Furthermore, to facilitate empirical analysis, original data on protest violence targets has been collected, expanding upon existing datasets like SCAD. This expanded dataset enables a more comprehensive examination of the origins, dynamics, and consequences associated with different targets of protest violence.

Lastly, this work carries important empirical implications for promoting social and political change in a peaceful and effective manner. Trend analysis by Chenoweth (2017) indicates a

significant decline in the success rates of nonviolent campaigns after 2010. The findings of this study provide suggestions for activists to critically reflect on the strategies employed in protest movements. By considering how protest behaviors can be devised effectively, this research contributes to the knowledge base on achieving successful outcomes in nonviolent campaigns.

2.2 Why states repress?

Before developing testable hypotheses, I first begin with outlining some studies on states' repression. Repression could be defined as 'coercive actions political authorities take to inhibit the will or capacity of people within their jurisdiction to influence political outcomes' (Ritter 2014, 145). During the social unrest, it could take the forms like policing the protest, intimidation and surveillance, media suppression, curfews, mass arrests and legal restrictions. The research on the coercive actions taken by state authorities starts with the attributes of the state actor, such as the regime type (Henderson 1991; Carey 2006), attributes related to state capacity (Koren 2014; Sullivan 2020; Liu and Sullivan 2021; Carey et al. 2022), the institutional constraints (Rivera 2017; Davis 2021), natural disaster (Wood and Wright 2016), and the domestic peace and conflict records (Gibler 2012; Wright 2014).

Looking in detail, Wright (2014) finds that domestic repression becomes more likely when the national government is involved in conflicts abroad. The underlying logic is that, at a certain level of repression to impede domestic unrest, it bolsters the public image of security forces and their capacity. In a similar vein, Liu and Sullivan (2021) argue that when local infrastructural power is weakened, the state is less likely to gather accurate information about dissidents. Consequently, it takes preventative action by aggressively reacting to challenges when they emerge. They find evidence by analyzing data on the behavior of the Guatemalan National Police.

More recent research distinguishes between preventive and reactive repression, which has generated interesting findings. Carey et al. (2022) finds connections between oil profits and preventive repression. It is argued that in weak states where oil discoveries are expected to shift power in the government's favor, repression increases as a preventive measure in anticipation of more challenges from rebel groups (Carey et al. 2022).

The timing of state-sponsored violence is a crucial factor to consider. A detailed study conducted by (Bhasin and Gandhi 2013) suggests that incumbent governments are more inclined to employ violence against opposition supporters before elections. Furthermore, scholars have explored various forms of international pressure (Wood 2008; Conrad and Ritter 2019; Peterson, Murdie, and Asal 2018). For instance, Conrad and Ritter (2019) reveals that the ratification of International Human Rights Treaties can lead to a decrease in government repression. Conversely, Allendoerfer, Murdie, and Welch (2020)) argues that while human rights organizations effectively attract international attention, certain forms of third-party pressure, such as economic sanctions and humanitarian intervention, have a detrimental impact on human rights conditions. In addition, liberal autocrats tend to employ protest policing when they perceive a threat from autonomous, national-level social movement organizations. This approach aims to discourage citizens from mobilizing with such groups and to maintain control over embedded organizations, potentially influencing the durability of liberalized regimes (Berman 2021).

Within the realm of research, a notable strand of inquiry centers on the intricate relationship between state actors and protesters, often adopting a generalized threat-response framework (Davenport 1995; Regan and Henderson 2002; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003). Regardless of the type of regime in place, state actors typically employ measures to quell social unrest when their own survival is perceived to be in jeopardy. Consequently, subsequent studies have sought to identify the key elements that constitute a 'threat' from the perspective of the government.

In terms of the demographics of nonviolent unrest participants, Nordås and Davenport (2013) reveal that political authorities consider a surge in young participants, particularly those between the ages of 15 and 24, as an imminent threat, leading them to be more inclined to engage in repressive activities. Furthermore, a survey conducted by Hsiao and Radnitz (2021) uncovers a phenomenon known as the 'repression bias.' It suggests that self-identified Republicans are more likely to perceive higher levels of violence when a disliked group is involved in protests, in contrast to Democrats.

Similarly, state actors often strategically deploy repressive measures against opposition parties (Bhasin and Gandhi 2013; Grasse et al. 2021) as their survival is consistently under threat from these entities. This approach is part of a broader effort to maintain political control and

stability.

Given that we have observed more violent episodes occur in the civil resistance campaigns, a burgeoning literature focus on the interrelated dynamics of protest and state violence. The two sides are endogenous: state's brutality strengthens the resolve and fuel further dissent meanwhile the occurrence of dissidents incentive the state to do so (Ritter 2014). For scholars who consider state violence as the outcome variable, taking into account the scope, magnitude, and intensity of protest violence, they have found that states can become more aggressive (Carey 2006). When considering the state's excessive use of violence as an independent variable, findings suggest that policing protesting crowds can escalate clashes more easily due to heightened tension at the scene. Indeed, these studies enlighten our understanding of the origins of state violence in social unrest (Adam-Troian, Çelebi, and Mahfud 2020). However, there is less adequate exploration of the variation in what and whom the attacks target.

2.3 Theory

This paper continues to address the question: why do state actors repress some protests while tolerating others? To better theorize the effect of targeting, I will begin by discussing the costly and deliberate nature of repression decisions in the following sections. Next, I will evaluate the determinants of threat from the perspective of state authority. Lastly, I will define various violent expressions that occur during nonviolent resistance and argue how these variations influence the likelihood of a state's repressive response differently.

2.3.1 Costly nature of repression

Repression by the state actor is not a decision taken lightly, as it carries significant costs and potential unintended consequences. Thus, while repression may seem like a straightforward response to perceived threats, the state actor must carefully consider the potential risks and trade-offs involved. First, previous studies have highlighted that such repressive actions often lead to backlash challenges (Sullivan and Davenport 2017). Repression can further escalate tensions, radicalize dissident (Araj 2008; Earl and Soule 2010; Bell and Murdie 2018), and decrease public support toward the state (Curtice 2021) or boost support toward the dissidents (Tran 2023). These unintended outcomes can have long-term implications for the stability and

legitimacy of the governing regime.

Repression can also have implications for the state actor's reputation and international standing. Excessive use of force, human rights abuses, or disproportionate responses to protests can tarnish a government's image and credibility. Sanctions, for instance, are a typical tool used by the international community to condemn domestic human rights violations (Wood 2008). This can lead to strained diplomatic relations, decreased foreign investment, and potential economic repercussions.

Moreover, repression is financially costly. The deployment of security forces, legal proceedings, and other repressive measures requires substantial financial and logistical resources. First and foremost, deploying security forces to handle protests requires significant funding. This includes expenses related to personnel salaries, training, equipment procurement, and maintenance. During the Hong Kong protests, for example, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region had to borrow security forces from the neighboring provincial government (Torode 2020). Xu (2021) finds that as the digital surveillance increases the local government's public security expenditure; thus we could observe a rise in targeted repression. The cost of maintaining a heightened security presence over an extended period of time can be considerable. Additionally, repressive measures may result in property damage, compensations, or the need for reparations. When security forces employ forceful tactics, there is a possibility of collateral damage to public infrastructure or private property. The state may be obligated to cover the costs of repairing or compensating for the damage inflicted during the repression. These expenses can be substantial, especially in cases where protests escalate into large-scale violence or when excessive force is used by security forces.

Furthermore, the costs of repression extend beyond the immediate financial burden (Barrett and Chen 2021). Hadzi-Vaskov, Pienknagura, and Ricci (2023) found that repression has an adverse effect on economic activity, with GDP remaining on average 0.2 percent below the pre-unrest baseline six quarters after a one-standard deviation increase in the unrest index. Ultimately, all these consequences can further amplify the overall cost of repression.

Therefore, given the potential costs and complexities involved in repression, evaluating the situation becomes imperative for the state actor to make informed decisions and navigate. To

do so, the state actor requires accurate information and intelligence to evaluate and respond to the threat posed by protest violence. Decision-making in repressive responses relies on a range of factors, including timely and reliable data on the nature and extent of violent incidents, the identities and motivations of the perpetrators, and the broader dynamics of the protest movement. Accurate information enables the state to assess the severity of the threat, the potential for escalation, and the strategic implications of different response options. Liu (2022) reveals that the state authority would barter impunity for defection and "tips" from the dissidents, granting a pardon to them. This implies that gathering intelligence about protest violence targets is particularly crucial for the state actor to make informed decisions and navigate the complex terrain of protest violence. It highlights the importance of precision in information.

2.3.2 Sources of threat

To construct a theory focused on the specificity of threats to state authorities, I begin by positing a well-studied premise: the use of violence by protesters inherently heightens the likelihood of repressive state responses (Carey 2006; Sullivan 2019). This notion is broadly acknowledged in the field of conflict and social unrest research. It is discussed in the section that serves as the bedrock for my ensuing analysis.

It is imperative to acknowledge that violence perpetrated by protesters constitutes a significant element of the threat. However, the state's inability to effectively quell such violence can lay bare the vulnerability of a national government, thereby intensifying the threat to its survival. When a government struggles to maintain control over domestic affairs, it may project an image of weakness and ineffectiveness to other internal actors who could harbor intentions of challenging its authority and power.

Within the nation's borders, factions opposing the government's policies or leadership may seize the opportunity to intensify their opposition and mobilize support against the ruling regime. The perception of governmental incapacity to uphold law and order can embolden these dissenting groups, potentially leading to further acts of violence and destabilization. This situation has the potential to escalate into widespread civil unrest or, in more extreme cases, armed insurgency, directly jeopardizing the government's stability and survival. Casper and Tyson (2014) provides insightful analysis regarding how public protests can facilitate political

elites planning a coup by establishing avenues for coordination.

Moreover, the persistence of violence and the perception of a weak government can erode public confidence in the state's ability to provide security and meet the basic needs of its citizens (Koonings and Kruijt 2004; Pearce, McGee, and Wheeler 2011). This loss of faith can further exacerbate social tensions and discontent, potentially fueling broader dissatisfaction with the government and increasing the likelihood of widespread protests or other forms of resistance (Rød, Hegre, and Leis 2022).

In summary, the lack of capacity to effectively stop the violence from protesters not only exposes the vulnerability of a national government but also creates an environment ripe for exploitation by internal and external actors. The resulting threats to the government's survival can manifest in various forms, including intensified internal opposition, external interference, and a loss of public confidence. It is therefore crucial for governments to have robust mechanisms in place to address and mitigate protest violence, ensuring the preservation of stability and the protection of their authority.

In addition, the use of violence by protesters and the clash between police forces at the scene extricates the state from the accusations of one-sided use of force. Most power-holders, from the democratic and the less democratic regimes justify the coercive action as the fair means to restored the disrupted social order. Second, violence from the supposedly 'civil' opposition does not only cost the reputation and the support (Simpson, Willer, and Feinberg 2018), but even increase support for repression (Lupu and Wallace 2019; Edwards and Arnon 2021). We often witness that some heads of government publicly justified the use of forces to restore order from the disruption caused by the protesting opposition (Reuters 2019). And such a framing technique is often effective (Edwards and Arnon 2021). Overall, a testable hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 2.1: The use of violence by protesters will increase the risks of state's repressive responses.

2.3.3 Disaggregated sources of threat: protest violence and targets

After establishing the benchmark that violence by protesters tends to prompt more repressive reactions from the state, the following sections delve deeper into the exploration of nuanced variations in state responses to protester violence.

In line with the argument on sources of threat, it is important to recognize that the sources of threat are multifaceted and nuanced. We need to take into account their scope, magnitude, intensity, and whether they are spontaneous or planned in order to identify the conditions under which political authorities feel more threatened and thus use indiscriminate repression.

And I argue that it is crucial to consider the targeting of such violence. The targets of violent acts during protests carry different symbolic and practical implications, which can influence the state's perception of the threat and its subsequent response. Studies on violence targets have been fruitful in the discourse of terrorism (Polo and Gleditsch 2016; Polo 2020), interstate conflicts (Kalyvas 2006), and other manifestations of collective violence (Martin, McCarthy, and McPhail 2009), while such targeting is not adequately addressed within the context of civil resistance.

One straightforward reason why the state actor will consider who or what is being targeted by riotous demonstrators is because the values of objects are different (Martin, McCarthy, and McPhail 2009). In simple terms, the behaviors of some rioters vandalizing government offices may not influence the state's reaction in the same manner as students forcibly occupying university buildings. More importantly, various targets provide better information about challengers' resilience, determination, capacity, and the future of the movement for the state to weigh the choice of subsequent behaviors. However, previous empirical analyses might disregard this strong substantive reason. Consequently, the failure to include an interaction term between the binary measure of protest violence and the corresponding target type in the modeling could potentially lead to erroneous conclusions.

To advance this line of inquiry, it is necessary to identify which types of violence by protesters genuinely make political authorities feel threatened. To achieve this, I propose borrowing the typology of soft and hard targets from Polo and Gleditsch (2016) and adapting it to the discourse of protest violence. Within this framework, hard targets include government

Table 2.1: **Typology of hard and soft targets in protest violence**

Hard and official targets	Soft Civilians Targets
Government	Civilians
Police	Business
Public Transportation	Educational Institutions
Telecommunications	Private properties
Utilities	Other

buildings, politicians, police, and public facilities and infrastructures, which are akin to official targets in the context of terrorism. Conversely, soft targets encompass organizations and individuals with no official role in the state apparatus. To better link a distinction with the following discussion on the targeting of protest violence, I first list some common hard and soft targets in nonviolent resistance in Table 2.1.

With reference to the outcomes of the target selection, the authority could better identify threat from 'groups that can credibly promise to impose costs on the government that could force it to change its policies' (Ritter 2016, 2). Repression is costly so that actor is less willing to squander resources and political capital on repressing a group that is less threatening to their power (Ritter 2016). Besides, there is still uncertainty about the possible outcome of repressive strategies and the future of this civil unrest. States need such information for the cost-and-benefit calculus on the disproportionate responses after the outburst of protest violence.

I argue that violent attacks on government officials and public property are more likely to incite repressive responses. In the analysis of the motivation and implementation of protest violence, attacks on authority-related targets pose a direct and credible threat to the state actor compared to other types of collective violence. First, protesters signal a strong resolve to the government about their political preferences. In a way, the switch from nonviolent channels to violent tactics, when the former strategies fail to make progress, is usually led by tenacious dissidents (Ryckman 2020). They are more resolute, unyielding, and defiant. Challengers capable of carrying out acts of violence against the authority send another signal to the state that they are less committed to the nonviolent approach. Attacking these "hard targets" signifies that dissidents are prepared to bear significant costs and escalate conflicts with the authorities to effect political change. Consequently, given their advantage in asymmetric conflicts, the government

is less inclined to concede when faced with such determined and aggressive challengers.

Second, as explained before, compared to other peaceful individuals engaging in dissent, protesters willing to cause harm might be fueled by deeper and stronger distrust toward the authority and greater frustration with the status quo. Attacks directed against hard targets are a clear expression of fear and antagonism. Normally, the state actor is less likely to discern who among the challengers is negotiable or not. However, attacks on the police could provide the state with information to identify the dissidents who are most hostile towards them. Moreover, the psychological process of breeding distrust and losing faith among dissidents may not be reversible, nor is violent escalation. Overall, this affects the state's expectations of the movement's prospects, urging them to employ abusive strategies.

Last but not least, conducting attacks on hard targets indicates that those demonstrators are resourceful in coordinating among actors to pose an immediate threat to state facilities. The stone-pelting young protesters in India (Ganie 2021) are certainly less resourceful than those who stormed the Capitol Building. Besides being tangibly disruptive for the government, these enterprising organizations or individuals will be more capable of imperiling its survival in the future.

To sum up, more information would be revealed after the outbreak of protest violence. Attacking hard targets changes the state actor's beliefs about the likely threat and destructiveness of the movement and the future of this supposedly "nonviolent" resistance. Therefore, they do not resort to less costly strategies but react aggressively, as such threats might be costly to ignore in the future. Based on the above, I contend that reactive repression is more likely to be observed with police attacks and government property destruction. Hence, my theory generates the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2.2: When protest violence occurs, if the protesters attack the government-related individuals and facilities, the state actor is especially likely to react repressively.

2.3.4 Disaggregated sources of threat: attacking people/properties

If targeting government or civilian-affiliated entities can serve as a means to communicate their determination and capabilities to the state, it is also important to consider the potential

Table 2.2: **Typology of people and properties as targets in protest violence**

People as targets	Properties as targets
Police	Public Transportation
Politician	Government Buildings
Civilians as bystanders	Shop/Shoping Mall

effects of attacking individuals or objects on the decision-making of state actors. The term "properties" in this paper refers to attacks on infrastructure such as buildings, roads, and shops, while "individuals" as targets would often include police officers, politicians, shop owners, and bystanders (summarised in Table 2.2).

Attacks on "properties" like buildings, roads, and shops may have broader economic and societal implications. They can disrupt daily life, disrupt services, and convey a message of discontent towards the state's infrastructure and governance. On the other hand, targeting "individuals" such as police officers, politicians, and bystanders can have direct and immediate implications on the state's security apparatus, public perception, and overall stability. It might provoke a swift response from the state, potentially escalating the conflict further.

Drawing from existing theories, I would argue that targeting individuals would increase the sense of threat perceived by the state, potentially leading to a more repressive reaction. Police officers and innocent bystanders are often common targets of such attacks. When individuals are targeted in these attacks, it tends to create a heightened sense of threat within the state apparatus. It is because attacking people is a direct confrontation, the threat, comparing with blocking the streets with fire or smashing store windows, is more imminent.

This perception of direct harm to individuals, particularly police officers and innocent bystanders, can lead to increased concerns over security and stability. In response to such perceived threats, state actors may be more inclined to adopt repressive measures to maintain control and protect the population. This could involve an escalation of security forces, stricter law enforcement, and potential limitations on civil liberties. The reasoning behind these actions is often rooted in the state's duty to ensure public safety and order.

On the other hand, drawing inspiration from a detailed description of infrastructure attacks by RENAMO during the civil war in Mozambique (Hultman 2009), the aim of this study is

to provide additional insights into the targeting of infrastructure during protests. In civil wars, rebel groups strategically destroy infrastructure that is considered crucial for the economy or transportation networks, with the explicit goal of isolating and controlling specific areas (Hultman 2009). Differently, during anti-government campaigns, dissidents may choose to target buildings and infrastructure such as university libraries, city administration offices, or stores as tactical objectives. These choices of locations are often meaningful and demonstrate strategic decision-making.

For instance, in Kazakhstan, people protesting high fuel prices stormed a main administrative building in the country's biggest city, which highlights the targeted nature of their actions (Jazeera 2022). Similarly, in Mexico, masked female protesters set part of a building belonging to a government human rights commission on fire, following their act with graffiti (Jasso 2020). These acts of targeting specific buildings indicate a deliberate message, with the Kazakh protesters expressing their discontent with high fuel prices and the Mexican protesters addressing the inaction to protect women's basic rights. Furthermore, it is important to note that even incidents of looting shops are not indiscriminate but can serve as a tactic to make a claim against poverty and the unequal distribution of wealth and resources.

By examining these cases, it becomes evident that attacking buildings is often employed as a strategic and deliberate tactic to make a specific claim or convey a message. Similarly, targeting individuals is also a deliberate act observed during my data collection. The targets of such attacks often include presidents, opposition party supporters, and police officers.

However, it is important to consider the limitations of dissidents' military capacities. Unlike in civil wars, where rebel groups may have the means to completely destroy infrastructure, dissidents in anti-government campaigns often lack such capabilities and can only cause limited damage. Consequently, when dissidents target infrastructure during protests, their actions may result in symbolic harm rather than posing a direct threat to the government. For example, blocking streets with fire or smashing store windows can disrupt daily life and send a message of discontent, but it may not evoke the same level of immediate fear or concern within the state as assaulting individuals would.

While these actions still carry significant symbolic implications, their physical impact may

be less severe compared to direct harm to individuals. As a result, their effect on state decision-making and the government's response to protests may differ. The focus may shift towards addressing the logistical or economic consequences of targeting infrastructure, rather than employing immediate repressive measures to counter a perceived threat to security. The state may be more inclined to prioritize resolving the resulting logistical or economic disruptions rather than responding with severe repression.

In summary, while targeting infrastructure during protests can still disrupt daily life and send a clear message of discontent, it is important to recognize that sabotaging places may not evoke the same level of immediate fear or concern within the state as assaulting individuals would. So, another testable hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 2.3: When protest violence occurs, if the protesters attack people, the state actor is especially likely to react repressively.

2.4 Research design

In order to investigate the influence of violence targets on state behaviors, detailed data is crucial, which is currently lacking in existing datasets. To address this gap, I have developed the Protest Violence and Targets Dataset (PVTS). This dataset is the result of an extensive data collection effort, which involved a comprehensive review of newspaper articles on *LexisNexis*.

This meticulous curation process focused on identifying instances where protesters caused harm to individuals, inflicted damage on properties and infrastructures, and captured the nature of these targets. The foundation for this endeavor was the SCAD dataset (Salehyan et al. 2012), which records social conflicts in an event-based format, providing information on the date, location, and actors involved but lacks explicit measures of protest violence, as well as the characteristics of victims and targets.

As a result, I undertook the task of extracting and compiling all relevant news articles related to social conflicts in Africa between 2000 and 2017. SCAD provides descriptions of news sources in its own coding, and I revisited the original reports to determine the presence of violent elements and, if present, their nature.

For example, in 2001, activists in Algeria initiated a series of protests and demonstrations to express discontent with the national government. These protests occurred against a backdrop of long-standing cultural marginalization of the Berber linguistic group in Algeria. On June 14th, 2001, the Associated Press reported:

'Protesters, some carrying knives and hatchets, threw stones and iron bars at facades of buildings, destroying them. They also bashed in the glass front of the Sofitel, the most luxurious hotel in Algiers, and destroyed dozens of cars.'

Based on this information, violence from protesters and damage to private properties can be found. Consequently, for each event, I identify and code the presence of protest violence, soft attack, hard attack, attacks on people, and attacks on properties. In the PVTS dataset, I take a binary measurement to focus on whether dissidents in a protest event resort to such violence or not. I prefer this dichotomous measurement as it provides informative data and is more appropriate than counting the number of attacks or casualties. Newspaper-generated data may either underreport or overreport some attacks and can be subject to selection bias.

This comprehensive dataset complements the SCAD dataset and encompasses 46 African countries, spanning eighteen years. For country-level descriptive information, please refer to Appendix 2A.

To empirically test my argument, I mainly rely on the data on anti-government protests in Africa from the SCAD (Salehyan et al. 2012) and PVTS datasets. This paper takes a broad definition of protest and considers it as an umbrella term: any organized or sporadic anti-government movements, primarily leveraging 'civilian-based methods,' are defined as 'protest.' This allows me to comprehensively examine the effect of high- and low-profile dissident violence across various types of nonviolent conflicts.

Given that the main research interest is centered on civil anti-government conflict events, I have excluded cases where the primary targets were foreign governments, international organizations (such as the World Bank and United Nations Office), international communities, corporations, and civilian targets (including religious communities, ethnic tribes, and teachers). This

ensures that the observations in the final dataset align with the theoretical argument's definition and that the models capture a sufficiently high number of heterogeneous protest events while reducing selection bias.

The unit of analysis in this study is the country-year, as the temporal aggregation of protest events facilitates understanding the underlying trends and systematic patterns over time. My data sample for analysis comprises 680 country-years. The temporal trends of event numbers and protest violence in the study period are depicted in Figure 2.1. This plot suggests a significant observation: as the frequency of events increases, there is a noticeable rise in the occurrence of protest violence. This consistent pattern implies a potential association between the two variables, indicating that the clustering of events within a given year might have a role in initiating or influencing the intensity of protest violence.

Figure 2.1: **Number of protests and violent attacks over time**



2.4.1 Outcome variable

To measure the magnitude of the state's use of violence associated with protests as an outcome variable, I quantified how frequently state forces violently intervene in protest events. SCAD (Salehyan et al. 2012) provides a three-tiered categorization of state repression: 0 signifies no repression, 1 indicates non-lethal measures (e.g., tear gas, arrests), and 2 denotes lethal repression, where deaths are reported. For simplicity, I recoded this trichotomous classification into a binary measure: whether a protest faced state repression or not. By aggregating this data at the country-year level, I calculated the number of protest events that experienced government

violent intervention. This count serves as the outcome variable, reflecting the yearly total of such incidents for each country.

2.4.2 Explanatory variables

To examine the relationships between protest violence and state repression, I take into account the nuanced differences in the types of targets and attacks involved. I operationalize these variations by categorizing them into distinct types, specifically attacks on government-related targets, civilian-related targets, attacks on individuals, and attacks on properties as listed in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. The PVTS Dataset provides binary data indicating whether a particular event involved hard or soft attacks and whether the targets were individuals or property.

For the analysis, I aggregate data related to violence and four types of attacks from protest events at the country-year level. The analysis incorporates five independent variables that account for the number of violent incidents associated with protests and the number of each type of attack: hard attacks, soft attacks, attacks on people, and attacks on properties, within each observation unit.

2.4.3 Control covariates

I control for other variables to avoid omitted variable bias and to increase the accuracy of estimates. First, some standard country-level covariates are included. I control the national economic prosperity using the GDP per capita and the population size from the World Bank Data, and take the natural logarithm of these two items. The GDP per capita is also related to the state capacity while the population size decides the extent of perceived threat for the state authority when violence occurs.

Then, I control a series of variables that are related to the risks of using violence by protesters and the state actor. First, to control the regime type, I include the index from the V-dem (Coppedge et al. 2019) dataset to measure to what extent the ideal of participatory democracy achieved. Weighing the costs and benefits of using aggressive strategies for the state actor might take into account the capacity of the opposition group, which is linked with potential threat if the current government loses people's confidence in them or the unsolved disputes creates opportunities for the oppositions to mobilized and to be mobilized. And V-dem (Coppedge

et al. 2019) provides an ordinal variable, named *Opposition Group Size* from 0, *Extremely Small*, to 4, *Large*, to measure the share of the domestic populations who could be seen as noteworthy opposition actors to the current political regime. I use this specific variable to control for the threat from possible coup actions in the opposing elite.

To measure the intensity degree between protesters and the authority, I employ the number of protests within an observation unit as a proxy. This variable serves as an indicator of the level of confrontation between the state and its citizens. Additionally, I include an indicator variable to determine whether external actors are involved, drawing insights from Wright (2014). Moreover, I account for the presence of state actor involvement in disputes with rebel groups. These control variable allow me to consider the allocation of state resources towards managing both protest unrest and other conflicts. To incorporate these control variables, I utilize the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Davis 2021) and create dichotomous variables indicating the existence of interstate and intrastate conflicts in a given country-year.

To capture state capacity in my analysis, I utilize the recently released Capacity index data by Hanson and Sigman (2021). This comprehensive measure takes into account various dimensions associated with the strength of state governance, including fiscal capacity, bureaucratic quality, provision of public goods, legal capacity, and the monopoly on violence. The Leviathan index provides a scaled measure ranging from -2.31 to 2.96, where higher values indicate greater state strength. I incorporate this capacity measure as it is relevant to understanding the propensity of protesters in weaker states to resort to violence. Weaker states are often perceived as posing less risk of backlash from the authorities (Sullivan 2019, 2020). The index data covers the time period from 1960 to 2015. To address missing information outside this time frame, I adopt an approach of imputation. Specifically, for countries with missing data in 2016 and 2017, I calculate the average values of the past five years for the respective country.

2.5 Empirical analysis

I now empirically test how various targets of violence affect the number of events that meet state repression. In Table 2.3, I present the baseline regression model. The full models in Table 2.4

employ ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators, incorporating control variables, along with country and year effects. My regression equation takes the following form:

$$Y_{ijt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1ijt} + \beta_2 X_{2ijt} + \ldots + \beta_k X_{kijt} + \gamma_1 C_i + \gamma_2 Y_t + \epsilon_{ijt} \tag{2.1}$$

In this equation, Y_{ijt} represents the level of state repression in country i at year t, while X_{1ijt} through X_{kijt} denote the key independent variables. The coefficients β_1 through β_k represent the estimated effects of these independent variables on state repression. Additionally, the model includes control variables represented by the vector C_i, and country and year fixed effects are captured by γ_1 and γ_2 respectively. The inclusion of fixed effects accounts for unobserved time-constant variations between countries and global temporal trends and shocks.

I first observe positive estimates for most key independent variables. Differences in coefficient estimates suggest that these targets have varying impacts on the outcome variable. The regression results also indicate that the variable, *Protest Violence*, seems not to be the most influential predictor. To better visualise these differences, Figure 2.2 plots the coefficients of the explanatory variables. *Hard Targeting* and *Attacks on People* have the largest effects. Regarding the substantive interpretation, For every one-unit increase in hard targeting, the state repression increases by 0.42 units, while holding other factors constant. This effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. This implies that when protesters specifically target hard infrastructure or entities, states are more likely to respond with repression. For every one-unit increase in attacks on people, the state repression increases by 0.71 units. This result is statistically significant at the 0.1% level. This suggests that when protesters resort to violence against individuals, states respond with significantly heightened repression. This finding receives support from various model specifications.

Hypothesis 2.1 receives partial support. The relationship between protest violence and state repression is not consistently strong, significant, or predominant when compared with other violence-related variables. This observation, to some degree, suggests that there might be intervening factors or mediators that influence or clarify the relationship between protest violence and state repression. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of disaggregating the aggregate measure of protest violence.

Table 2.3: **Protest violence & targets and state repression (bi-variate)**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Protest Violence	0.98***				
	(0.04)				
Soft Targeting		1.05***			
		(0.09)			
Hard Targeting			1.02***		
			(0.04)		
Attacks on People				1.24***	
				(0.06)	
Attacks on Properties					0.99***
					(0.05)
Num. obs.	406	406	406	406	406

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

When categorizing violence by targets, the effect sizes indicate that attacks on people have the most pronounced influence on state repression among the four variables, followed closely by hard targeting. In contrast, soft targeting and attacks on properties manifest relatively minor effects, with the influence of soft targeting being nearly inconsequential. Collectively, these findings lend support to Hypothesis 2.2 and Hypothesis 2.3. In terms of policy implications, it seems that state reactions are particularly attuned to violence against individuals and hard targets during protests.

These findings indicate that the national government's reputation and legitimacy are gravely compromised when individuals are harmed, even when juxtaposed against the potentially higher economic costs of repairing physical structures like buildings, shops, or public transportation. Consequently, state authorities tend to prioritize strategic political maneuvers to quell unrest or address the grievances of the harmed individuals. They recognize that incidents of violence targeting individuals might influence public perception, which could have implications for the government's image and public response.

Another noteworthy finding across various model specifications is the consistent positive impact of the *Event Number* variable, which match the conclusion we could draw from Figure 2.1. This suggests that concentrated turmoil, characterized by a high frequency of protests, increases the risks of state repressive responses. This finding aligns with existing studies on the clustering of social unrest. While one might expect that a high level of social unrest would

Table 2.4: **Protest violence & targets and state repression**

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
Protest Violence	0.34^{**}					-0.69^{***}
	(0.12)					(0.17)
GDP(log)	-0.14	0.19	-0.22	0.58	-0.22	-0.15
	(0.73)	(0.60)	(0.81)	(0.73)	(0.70)	(0.09)
Population(log)	5.62^{*}	5.58^{*}	4.56^{*}	4.43^{*}	5.10^{*}	-0.06
	(2.58)	(2.40)	(2.21)	(1.99)	(2.26)	(0.08)
Democracy Index	-1.26	-1.03	-1.94	-1.35	-1.53	-3.94^{***}
	(1.74)	(1.56)	(1.83)	(1.63)	(1.74)	(0.78)
Opposition Group Size	0.46	0.47	0.43	0.71^{*}	0.42	0.30^{**}
	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.11)
Event Number	0.49^{***}	0.47^{***}	0.58^{***}	0.47^{***}	0.53^{***}	0.47^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)
State Capacity	0.12	0.05	0.14	-0.28	0.21	0.47^{*}
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.47)	(0.53)	(0.19)
Interstate Conflict	0.31	0.23	0.80	0.56	0.55	1.13
	(0.76)	(0.79)	(0.65)	(0.55)	(0.80)	(1.34)
Intrastate Conflict	-0.02	0.03	-0.32	0.04	-0.21	-0.03
	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.19)
Hard Targeting		0.40^{***}				0.42^{*}
		(0.10)				(0.17)
Soft Targeting			0.34^{***}			-0.05
			(0.10)			(0.09)
Attacks on People				0.56^{***}		0.71^{***}
				(0.07)		(0.10)
Attacks on Properties					0.30^{*}	0.17
					(0.13)	(0.11)
Num. obs.	354	354	354	354	354	354
Num. groups: country	40	40	40	40	40	40
Num. groups: year	18	18	18	18	18	18

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Notes: All models are OLS regression with country and year fixed effect.

I detected multicollinearity in Model 11 using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF).

The statistics suggest that multicollinearity is not concerning.

exert greater pressure on state actors to seek compromise, it actually leads to indiscriminate use of force against protesters. This implies that an increased frequency or scale of protests may trigger a stronger response from the state, potentially resulting in heightened repression. This finding sheds light on cases such as the Arab Spring, where an upsurge in protests led to a significant state crackdown.

Figure 2.2: **Coefficient plot of main independent variables, Model 11**



Note: Each dot represents the estimated coefficient for a specific variable, and the horizontal bars extending from each dot denote the 95% confidence interval.

In terms of protest dynamics, the *Opposition Group Size* variable exhibited a positive effect on state repression, although this effect did not always reach statistical significance. This suggests that larger opposition groups may potentially face higher levels of state repression, but further investigation is necessary to confirm this relationship. Additionally, the presence of interstate and intrastate conflicts did not show statistically significant effects on state repression during protests. This implies that conflicts occurring outside of the protest context, whether between states or within a state, do not exert a strong influence on the level of state repression during protests. However, it is important to note that these findings do not contradict previous research, as the measurement of state repression in these models specifically pertains to reactions within the context of social campaigns.

2.6 Addressing endogeneity concern

The findings discussed above raise concerns of endogeneity, given the potential for reciprocal causal pathways that might influence the relationship between violence targets and state repression. In other words, endogeneity is prominent here because of the intertwined nature of state violence and protest violence. For example, if a government reacts to peaceful protests with heightened repression, this might compel protesters to resort to violence in retaliation. On the other hand, if protests become violent, the government may intensify its repression to retain control.

Thus, the endogeneity concern arises in my previous statistical analysis due to the unclear sequence of violence between protesters and the state authority. Which side initiated the first action could not be definitively confirmed during the data coding process in PVTS. Furthermore, utilizing the country-year as the observation unit could introduce potential bias into the estimated effects.

To address this concern, I analyze the temporal trend of the state's use of force in protests to provide a clearer understanding of the process. The information I present is sourced from ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010). To proxy the level of repression, I select protests that experienced attacks from the police or military, as recorded in ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010), under interaction code 16, indicating 'state forces versus protesters.' I focus on the time period of 2019 and begin by examining Algeria as the primary case.

In 2019, the Hirak Movement protests started on February 16, 2019, after President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced his candidacy for a fifth presidential term (Human Rights Watch 2022). Thousands of Algerians started with peacefully marching in the capital, Algiers, and other cities across the country every Friday. However, they often faced a heavy police presence on the streets, and in some cases, even experienced a serious crackdown from state forces (Al Jazeera 2021).

The temporal pattern of the state's use of force during the Hirak Movement is illustrated in Figure 2.3. In the context of Algeria, where peaceful protests were occasionally punctuated by instances of violence, especially in late 2019 – such as protesters throwing ballots from a schoolhouse and setting tires on fire to disrupt public transportation (Daragahi 2019) – an

interesting trend becomes apparent. Observing Figure 2.3, it becomes evident that subsequent to attacks on significant government-related targets, the state notably intensified its control measures.

Figure 2.3: **Monthly sums of state violence against protesters in Algeria, 2019**



Another significant case is the street protests that swept across Sudan on December 19, 2018, and continued with sustained civil disobedience for about eight months. The pattern of the Sudanese government's use of force is presented in Figure 2.4. During the movement, the Sudanese government faced substantial condemnation from the international community. NSF soldiers opened fire on unarmed protesters, resulting in the immediate deaths of many. These soldiers then proceeded to round up and physically assault the protesters, subjecting them to various forms of abuse and humiliation. Additionally, they set fire to tents, looted, and systematically destroyed property (Human Rights Watch 2019). Turning to the depiction of abusive behaviors by the Sudanese government, in Figure 2.4, the first red line indicates the initial observed violent actions by protesters, which occurred on December 9 in the city of Atbara in the River Nile state. Demonstrators set fire to the headquarters of the ruling National Congress party, completely destroying it (Assal 2019). Later, as the protests progressed, women emerged as a driving force behind the movement. Alaa Salah, a student and a symbolic leader, first began leading chants against al-Bashir outside the military headquarters on April 10 (Ismail 2019). However, mild violence resumed after the military council and opposition groups announced an agreement on the country's transition following the removal of President Omar al-Bashir (Guardian 2019). Protesters resorted to blocking the streets with violent tactics (Re-

liefWeb 2019). Even though the Sudanese government is generally considered repressive, we can observe variations in the levels of abuse across different types of protester behaviors.

Figure 2.4: **Monthly sums of state violence against protesters in Sudan, 2019**



These two plots support part of my theories, especially H2.2. It's important to acknowledge that the evidence presented here is primarily descriptive and lacks control over potential biases stemming from omitted variables or heterogeneity across different countries. Therefore, it's crucial to avoid interpreting this evidence as establishing a causal effect. However, even within these limitations, this descriptive analysis still provides valuable trend insights and lends support to my empirical tests. Other robustness check like sensitivity analysis is included in the Appendix B. The provided statistics in Table 2.7 indicate that the observed effects of target-related variables on state repression are statistically significant and unlikely to be the result of random chance.

2.7 Conclusion

This study has examined the dynamics of protest violence and its impact on the decision-making of state actors. By leveraging newly collected information and mapping out the threat levels of various targets, the findings underscore the crucial role that targeting strategies play in shaping the state's response to protest violence. Different targeting strategies exert varying levels of influence on the state's decision-making process. The analysis reveals that the government is particularly concerned about direct damage caused by highly coordinated dissidents who pose a significant threat to their power and control. In response, the state may employ re-

pressive measures to curtail these groups and prevent the escalation of unrest into a full-blown rebellion.

Understanding the potential effects and consequences of protest tactics can inform decision-making and contribute to a more nuanced approach in achieving desired outcomes while minimizing unnecessary harm. By comprehending the dynamics of protest violence and mapping out the threat levels of various targets, policymakers and activists can strategize more effectively. They can prioritize actions that prioritize the well-being and safety of individuals, considering the potential impact on both the government's response and the broader objectives of the protest movement.

The findings emphasize the importance of considering not only the use of violence but also the specific targets and victims when assessing the state's response to protests or acts of dissent. The government's sensitivity to attacks on individuals, compared to damage inflicted on properties and buildings, suggests that the reputation and legitimacy of the national government are more at stake when harm is inflicted upon people. State authorities are more likely to employ strategic political maneuvers to address the grievances of affected individuals when harm is inflicted upon them. In contrast, they may downplay or disregard less harmful assaults on objects or infrastructure, as these may be seen as less threatening to their reputation and control. Recognizing the differential impact of targeting strategies can help dissidents and protesters navigate their actions to potentially gain more traction and support for their cause. Combining this with findings about the impact of violent protests on decreasing public support (Simpson, Willer, and Feinberg 2018) and the decreasing size of protests (Steinert-Threlkeld, Chan, and Joo 2022), it further encourages protesters to seek nonviolent disobedience strategies as a way forward.

While this study sheds light on the relationship between protest violence and state repression, it is important to note that the findings do not necessarily imply a causal relationship. Further research could benefit from more disaggregated studies that track the trajectory of social unrest, including the onset, progression, termination, and potential recurrence of protests. More future studies could contribute to better addressing endogeneity concerns.

Another limitation of the new dataset is the lack of validation in its current form. Typically,

human-coded datasets undergo validation through consultation with local experts to ensure accuracy. However, due to limited sources and access, such validation was not feasible for this study. Nonetheless, I acknowledge the importance of validation and recognize the need for future data collection efforts to prioritize collaborations and seek validation from local experts. By engaging in collaborative approaches, we can enhance the validity and reliability of similar datasets, thereby establishing a more robust foundation for analysis. Furthermore, it is crucial for future research to explore alternative approaches to validation, such as leveraging statistical methods like machine learning. Machine learning algorithms can be employed to automatically identify and validate news reports, providing an objective assessment of the dataset's validity and reliability. This can be achieved by comparing the dataset with established sources or expert-labeled data. Adopting such methodological advancements shows promise in enhancing the credibility of data collection efforts in studying protest violence and targeting strategies. By embracing these methodological improvements and actively seeking validation through expert input and statistical techniques, I aim to strengthen the rigor and credibility of future data collection endeavors focused on understanding protest violence and targeting.

Given the growing literature on protest violence and the state's reaction, future research can continue exploring the multifaceted factors that shape the decision-making processes of state actors. More studies could delve into the trajectory of social unrest, examining the factors influencing targeting strategies, the effects of different violent tactics on the mobilization process, and the contagiousness of specific targeting approaches. The comprehensive time-series cross-sectional dataset developed in this research, which includes mapping the threat levels of various targets, provides a valuable resource for empirical testing and opens up avenues for further investigation.

In conclusion, this study contributes to our understanding of protest dynamics and the influence of targeting strategies on the state's response. By considering the potential effects and consequences of protest tactics, policymakers and activists can make more informed decisions to promote social change while minimizing harm. However, further research is needed to establish causal relationships, address limitations, and explore additional dimensions of protest violence and state repression. By continuing to study these dynamics, we can gain valuable

insights into effective strategies for promoting social change and shaping a more just and inclusive society.

2.8 Appendix 2A: PVTS country-level summary

The detailed descriptive information of the PVTS datasets is included in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6.

Table 2.5: **Country-level information on violence targets: 2000-2017**

Country	**No. Obs (protests events)**	**Government targets**	**Civilian targets**
Algeria	171	53	5
Angola	41	5	1
Benin	39	3	0
Botswana	9	2	0
Burkina Faso	52	10	3
Burundi	88	22	2
Cameroon	73	18	2
Central African Republic	84	14	8
Chad	37	1	1
Cote d'Ivoire	153	53	3
DRC	183	53	4
Eritrea	5	2	0
Ethiopia	78	31	9
Gabon	57	18	3
Gambia	17	3	1
Ghana	23	5	0
Guinea	125	47	9
Guinea-Bissau	43	6	1
Kenya	263	109	38
Lesotho	9	1	0
Liberia	37	7	0
Libya	173	56	10
Madagascar	47	6	2
Malawi	71	23	10
Mali	55	9	5
Mauritania	81	14	2
Mauritius	3	0	0
Morocco	166	19	7
Mozambique	31	6	2

Table 2.6: **Country-level information on violence targets: 2000-2017**

Country	**Protests**	**Government targets**	**Civilian targets**
Namibia	6	2	0
Niger	103	34	3
Nigeria	434	99	19
Republic of Congo	14	5	0
Rwanda	1	0	0
Senegal	99	30	3
Sierra Leone	32	5	1
Somalia	36	12	5
South Africa	210	66	17
Sudan	7	44	9
Swaziland	64	7	3
Tanzania	46	12	3
Togo	94	27	2
Tunisia	232	75	22
Uganda	79	20	0
Zambia	74	20	9
Zimbabwe	284	26	9

2.9 Appendix 2B: Sensitivity analysis

I perform a sensitivity analysis of Model 6 to 10 in Table 2.4 for robustness check. Sensitivity analysis is a statistical technique used to examine the robustness and reliability of research findings by assessing how strong confounding would need to be to substantively alter our conclusions (Cinelli and Hazlett 2020), which has been used in conflict-related researches (Hazlett 2020). It aims to investigate the stability and consistency of conclusions in the presence of uncertainties or variations. Following the advice from Hazlett (2020), the summary sensitivity statistics are reported in Table 2.7. It shows the regression results for the model described above, augmented by several quantities that describe the sensitivity of the result to unobserved confounding.

Table 2.7: **Regression results with sensitivity statistics, outcome: state repress**

Treatment	Est.	S.E.	t-value	$R^2_{Y\sim D\|\mathbf{X}}$	$RV_{q=1}$	$RV_{q=1,\alpha=0.05}$
Soft Targeting	0.377	0.054	6.98	12.6%	31.5%	23.8%
Hard Targeting	0.467	0.045	10.337	24.1%	42.6%	36.4%
Protest Violence	0.412	0.046	8.949	19.2%	38.3%	31.5%
Attacks on People	0.548	0.046	11.833	29.4%	46.9%	41.2%
Attacks on Properties	0.376	0.047	7.957	15.8%	35%	27.7%
df = 337, *Bound (1x v2x_partipdem)*: $R^2_{Y\sim Z\|\mathbf{X},D}$ and $R^2_{D\sim Z\|\mathbf{X}}$ = 0.1%						

Taking *Soft Targeting* as an illustrative example from Table 2.7, the robustness value (RV) of 31.6% suggests that confounding accounts for roughly 31.6% of the residual variance in *Soft Targeting* and less than 31.6% of the residual variance in the outcome of *State Repression*. Similarly, the $RV_{\alpha=0.05}$ of 24 percent tells us that confounding would have to explain more than 24 percent of the residual variance in exposure and the outcome in order for the unbiased estimate to lose statistical significance at the .005 level. In total, the t-values for all treatments are relatively high. All the treatments in the table have t-values that are considerably higher than this threshold[1], suggesting that the observed effects of these treatments on state repression are statistically significant and not likely due to random chance.

This is particularly informative because *Democracy Index* is a "strong" covariate: the bombs could not be targeted at all. This suggests that confounding might be strong enough to over-

1. In general statistical practice, a t-value with an absolute value greater than 1.96 (at a 5% significance level) would be considered statistically significant for large samples.



Figure 2.5: **Soft attack: sensitivity of t-statistic with bounds**



Figure 2.6: **Hard attack: sensitivity of t-statistic with bounds**

turn or explain away all of the effect estimate. However, it is not concerning as adding such a powerful variable still lead to similar estimates. This indicates a high degree of robustness and reliability. To examine arguments about confounders that unequally relate to exposure and harm, we can consult contour plots in Figure 2.5, Figure 2.6, Figure 2.7, Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9. These show how hypothetical confounding, indexed by its strength of association with different targeting strategies (horizontal axis) and with *Repression* (vertical axis), would change the effect estimate.



Figure 2.7: **Protest violence: sensitivity of t-statistic with bounds**



Figure 2.8: **Attack on people: sensitivity of t-statistic with bounds**



Figure 2.9: **Attack on properties: sensitivity of t-statistic with bounds**

Chapter 3

A well disciplined nonviolent militia? Mobilisation experience and protester violence

What explains the variation in violence among protesters across different movements? Most literature has agreed that dissidents in nonviolent resistance resort to aggressive strategies as a response to the state's use of violence. However, why do some protesting groups use violence against state authorities in the absence of a direct threat from them? To address this question, this paper puts forth the argument that the utilization of violence by protesters is contingent upon two key factors: the protesters' mobilization experience and the constraints imposed by a formal organizational structure. By employing actor identity as a proxy measure, this study conducts a quantitative analysis of anti-government protest events spanning the period from 2000 to 2017 in Africa. The findings, while providing only partial support for the proposed hypothesis, shed light on the relationship between violence and specific characteristics of protest actors.

3.1 Introduction

Although participants in nonviolent conflict movements[1] are generally expected to adhere to their commitment to non-violence, why do some turn to violence? Indeed, instances of disruptive behavior are often observed within primarily civil resistance campaigns. Examples include hurling stones or Molotov cocktails at police, engaging in fistfights, vandalizing government buildings or private properties, and burning tires to disrupt public transportation. Less-equipped protesters, typically lacking combat experience, directly confront well-trained police or security forces. This approach is risky (Regan and Henderson 2002) and can be particularly costly

1. Note: In this paper, the term "nonviolent conflict" follows the definition from Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013), encompassing a broad spectrum of civil unrest, including peaceful demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins, rallies, and marches. The terms "nonviolent conflict," "nonviolent resistance," and "civil resistance" are used interchangeably throughout this paper.

(Murdie and Purser 2017; Wasow 2020). Considering the potential counterproductive effects, such as losing public support (Simpson, Willer, and Feinberg 2018; Lupu and Wallace 2019; Edwards and Arnon 2021), reducing the size of subsequent activities (Steinert-Threlkeld, Chan, and Joo 2022), and justifying the state's use of force in the public's eyes (Edwards and Arnon 2021), the use of violence by protesters remains a puzzle.

To address the questions mentioned above, this paper adopts an actor-oriented approach to explore the potential risks of violence within social movements. The analysis underscores two dimensions of non-state actors: the formal/informal networks and mobilization experience. Distinguishing between formal and informal networks among movement participants is crucial. Formal networks signify the existence of a structured organization that acts as a unifying entity for the mobilized members (Blau and Scott 1962). [2] The constraints imposed by such an entity often exceed the social pressures experienced by individuals in informal associations. Moreover, the presence of a formal network reinforces the discipline necessary to uphold a pledge to nonviolence.

I also contend that mobilization experience plays a significant role here. The term "mobilization experience" refers to the knowledge and skills acquired from continuous engagement within the network. A robust mobilization experience bolsters the ability to devise more sophisticated and expansive protest strategies, such as boycotts or large-scale strikes. This proficiency further amplifies a movement's efficiency in organizing and coordinating nonviolent actions. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that an informal network with extensive experience from regular gatherings will minimize the risks of violence.

Measuring formal/informal networks and mobilisation capacity in nonviolent conflicts can be challenging. However, actor identity is proposed as a plausible proxy for these factors. Actor identities can reveal why people join a social movement, how they are connected, and their societal position. Therefore, they can serve as significant predictors of sustained engagement over time (Corrigall-Brown 2011).

2. According to Blau and Scott (1962), a formal organization is explicitly constructed to coordinate efforts that realize "common goals" via collective initiatives. The regulations that organization members are expected to follow, as well as the hierarchical structure defining their relationships (as represented in the organizational chart), do not organically arise from social interactions. Instead, they are deliberately designed beforehand to direct interactions and activities (Blau and Scott 1962, 175).

To test the argument empirically, this paper utilizes anti-government protest event data from the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) (Salehyan et al. 2012) for Africa between the years 2000 and 2017. And it summarises a list of protest actors to facilitate the theory building and empirical tests. The findings from the logistic regression analysis offer partial support for the expectations delineated in the theoretical framework. The analysis reveals that actors associated with formal organizations and possessing greater political knowledge tend to lean towards peaceful actions. However, empirical tests also indicate that individuals who protest while embracing their professional identity tend to be particularly risk-averse to resorting to violence. Social embeddedness within a professional or workplace community imposes social, reputational, and practical constraints that dissuade individuals from participating in violent protests. While recognizing the limitations of using actor type as a proxy, I compare the performance of the April 4th Youth Movement in Egypt with the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia during the Arab Spring, underscoring the significance of possessing mobilization experience.

This paper makes three significant contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, it extends the research scope beyond traditional contextual and movement-level analyses (Kadivar and Ketchley 2018; Sullivan 2019; Ives and Lewis 2020). Instead, it adopts a more disaggregated and actor-oriented approach to examine the propensity for violence in civil resistance movements. Building upon the findings of Ives and Lewis (2020), which demonstrated that protests are more likely to escalate into violence when movements lack organization and emphasize the importance of identifiable hierarchical structures within the movement, this paper focuses on the formally constructed network of actors and examines its effects on the risks of violence.

Secondly, this paper continues the exploration into the identity and characteristics of non-state actors, drawing from research like Mueller (1992), Flesher Fominaya (2010), Braithwaite and Cunningham (2020), and Salehyan, Feinberg, and Naughton (2020). It highlights how actor-level identity—viewed as proxies for social embeddedness, the formality of group networks, and mobilization experience—affects the strategic decisions of social movements. Investigating these multifaceted attributes of actors deepens our comprehension of nonviolent contention and underscores the importance of an actor-oriented theoretical approach to analyzing social movements.

By doing so, this paper underscores the growing emphasis on comprehending the micro-dynamics of nonviolent resistance, aligning with recent scholarly pursuits (Davenport 2015; Hillesund 2015; Bramsen 2018; Berry 2019; Salehyan, Feinberg, and Naughton 2020). Furthermore, it enriches this line of enquiry by incorporating large-N analyses. It is acknowledged that employing actor identities as a proxy entails certain limitations, including potential oversimplifications and the risk of misclassification. Nevertheless, this approach offers a pragmatic methodology, highlighting the necessity for increased data collection efforts in this regard (Salehyan, Feinberg, and Naughton 2020). By setting out this direction, this study encourages future research to delve deeper into the intricacies of these factors, facilitating the development of more refined measures to accurately assess their impacts.

3.2 Literature review: violence in non-violent resistance

Nonviolent conflicts are inherently disruptive in nature (Tarrow 1993), yet they are not primarily intended to cause damage (Chenoweth, Stephan, and Stephan 2011). So, why do some protesters or challenging organizations, originally committed to employing "civil methods" to express their discontent, believe that causing harm can extract concessions or promote reform? The literature on protester violence is extensive (Davenport 2007; Berman 2021; Keremoğlu, Hellmeier, and Weidmann 2022; Steinert-Threlkeld, Chan, and Joo 2022) and can be categorized into two main strands.

The first strand focuses on factors related to the state actor (Soule and Davenport 2009; Hendrix and Haggard 2015). Dissidents are more likely to resort to violence when the incumbent government is perceived as a weak authority (Sullivan 2019). Subsequent studies have shown significant interest in the state-dissent relationship, considering the interaction with the state actor and arguing that non-state actors' decisions to use aggression are driven by necessity. A key argument is that people often turn to violence in response to the disproportionate use of state violence (Lichbach 1987; Bell and Murdie 2018; Ives and Lewis 2020).

Furthermore, scholars have recognized that the effect of state repression on violent protests is conditional, depending on various contextual factors. For instance, a study by Bell and Murdie (2018) reveals that states with a history of civil war are more likely to experience violent

protests in response to repression. This finding suggests that the presence of a prior civil war provides non-state actors with organizational tools and knowledge, reducing the costs associated with engaging in more violent forms of dissent.

The second strand of literature focuses on the individual-level factors that contribute to the propensity for violent dissent among protesters. One explanation is based on the idea that mounting grievances can fuel violence (Almeida 2003). Specifically, studies such as Gustafson (2020) demonstrate that high food prices and unemployment rates increase the likelihood of resorting to violence as individuals become impatient when their basic needs are unmet. Additionally, the failure of the social movement to achieve substantive progress can also contribute to increasing grievances (Koopmans 1993; De Fazio 2016).

Furthermore, Ryckman (2020) suggest that the presence of violence-wielding groups, such as radical flanks and parallel armies, can raise the risks of escalation, depending on the concessions made by the government. On the other hand, certain group dynamics can act as inhibitors to deter the use of violence. For example, Haran Diman and Miodownik (2022) find a robust negative correlation between social cohesion and riots in East Jerusalem neighborhoods, indicating that strong social cohesion within a community can discourage violent actions.

Another mechanism proposed in the literature is that violence can be seen as a tool to attract attention (Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Simpson, Willer, and Feinberg 2018). Violent episodes tend to draw significant attention from the media and other actors, including high turnout during protests (Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Hellmeier, Weidmann, and Geelmuyden Rød 2018). Extensive media coverage, whether positive or negative, can exert pressure on the state actor. Additionally, Murdie and Bhasin (2011) find that international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) focusing on human rights can potentially contribute to higher levels of violent protests. This occurs when local protesters seek to gain the attention of human rights organizations with a presence in the area. The strong connections to the local population suggest that these NGOs inadvertently provide sources and inadvertently spark violent protests (Murdie and Bhasin 2011).

Last but not least, violence can serve as a mechanism for signaling the participants' courage and determination in their struggle against powerful forces. This symbolic aspect of violence

is evident in various protest movements. For instance, Ganie (2021) examines the case of the Kashmir self-determination movement and highlights the symbolic importance of protesters throwing stones. Similarly, Kadivar and Ketchley (2018) conducts research on collective violence in Egypt during the January 25 Revolution and reaches a similar conclusion. The attacks on police stations not only disrupt the coercive capacity of the state but also demonstrate the power of the people (Kadivar and Ketchley 2018).

3.3 Theory

3.3.1 Violence and discipline

Previous literature have suggested that protester violence is often a result of a lack of discipline (Polletta 2002; Pearlman 2012; Pinckney 2016), operating at both the individual and group levels. At the individual level, self-discipline plays a critical role in sustaining nonviolent engagement during prolonged struggles for change, even in the face of grievances and despair. Without self-discipline, negative emotions can easily erode faith in the effectiveness of nonviolent tactics, leading to the emergence of violent outbursts.

Self-discipline among protesters is influenced by two key factors. Firstly, individuals recognize that their actions during protests cannot be separated from their daily lives, including their responsibilities towards jobs and families. This recognition fosters restraint in their behavior as they consider the potential costs and consequences associated with resorting to disruptive or aggressive tactics. Consequently, protesters make a conscious effort to adhere to nonviolent principles and maintain discipline, even when faced with provocation or frustration. Secondly, the presence of hope plays a crucial role in sustaining self-discipline among protesters. This hope stems from the trust and belief that individuals place in a reliable organization, leader, or a clear and compelling call to action (Ives and Lewis 2020). When individuals have faith in the cause they are fighting for and perceive a viable path towards positive change, it strengthens their commitment to nonviolent tactics and bolsters their self-discipline. Belief in the potential effectiveness of nonviolent means encourages individuals to remain disciplined and dedicated to their cause, even in the face of challenges or setbacks.

Discipline also operates at the group level during periods of civil unrest triggered by con-

flicts, creating opportunities for violence-oriented individuals or factions, commonly known as radical flanks (Ives and Lewis 2020; Belgioioso, Costalli, and Gleditsch 2021). In this context, violence becomes a classic principal-agent problem (Miller 2005) as the leaders or organizers of the movement aim to achieve their objectives through nonviolent means. However, the behavior of certain subgroups or individuals within the movement may deviate from the intended nonviolent strategy, causing a divergence between the goals of the overall movement and the actions of these factions. This misalignment of interests and behaviors poses a challenge to maintaining group discipline and coherence in the pursuit of nonviolent tactics. While the leading members of the movement advocate for obtaining concessions from the government through nonviolent means, smaller factions or individuals within the movement may develop a preference for violence, deviating from the movement's overall strategic approach.

3.3.2 Formal organisational structure, mobilisation experience and risk of violence

Building upon these assumptions, I will delve deeper into the determinants of adding discipline constraints and explore the conditions under which protesters gain confidence in their ability to peacefully fight for their movement's claims, while minimizing the risk of "traitorous agents" who deviate from the nonviolent path.

The first aspect of my argument centers on the principal-agent issue in nonviolent resistance. Dissenting groups or individuals are not unitary group (Pearlman 2012; Davenport 2015), but the likelihood of encountering intractable agents is higher for certain groups. In contrast to actors informally connected within collective action (Branch and Mampilly 2015), formal structures are deliberately crafted to consolidate individuals and resources towards shared objectives (Blau and Scott 1962, 450). Upon the foundation of a formal organization, the stipulated rules that members are to adhere to, along with the predetermined status structure governing their interrelations (as illustrated in the organizational chart), are purposefully delineated to steer and preempt interactions and activities (Blau and Scott 1962, 175). Formal groups or a leader serve a guiding, lighthouse function, and by offering hope alongside a distinct agenda, they bolster participants' faith in the potency of civil resistance methods (Pinckney 2016; Ives and Lewis 2020). As a result, when juxtaposed with movements orchestrated via informal networks or spontaneous channels, formal groups exhibit a better capacity to manage individual behavior.

To sum up the above discussion, I propose the first testable hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3.1: The presence of formal organizational infrastructures reduces the likelihood of actors resorting to violence.

However, the effect of restrictions imposed by formally established networks may be moderated by another important factor: mobilization experience. It intuitively makes sense that a newly formed group would be less trained and experienced. However, the element of time holds deeper significance for several reasons. Firstly, mobilisation experience can often stem from pre-existing connections even before a protest is organized. While formal groups have their merits, it is worth noting that informally connected groups can also amass substantial experience over time. Such informal networks typically emerge from various social affiliations, be it military service, workplace interactions, or ties within religious or ethnic communities (Blau and Scott 1962; Kilduff and Krackhardt 2008). An illustrative example of this is the recent demonstration by indigenous communities in South Africa protesting against offshore oil and gas exploration (Schneider 2021). Within these social networks, where knowledge is shared and ideas converge, individuals collaboratively pursue common goals, ultimately reinforcing both group cohesion and individual commitment to non-violence.

Secondly, mobilization also denotes that the movement is actively engaging in initiatives to uphold the group's momentum. Frequent engagement, for instance, often corresponds with accruing political knowledge (Kilgore 1999; Tilly 2008). Persistent training enriches participants' comprehension of the movement's goals, and joint activities facilitate the formation of alliances. As members unify, they establish stronger social connections and mutual commitments, gearing up to handle potential risks collectively (Gamson 1991).

Greater experience in mobilization tends to foster better discipline among participants. Such seasoned actors are adept at regulating and controlling participant behavior, which in turn diminishes the chances of violence. Moreover, effective nonviolent tactics necessitate heightened coordination. Those with a broad history of mobilization are apt to acquire and hone potent nonviolent strategies, ranging from large-scale labor strikes to widespread noncoopera-

tion via consumer boycotts. These actors have the proficiency to orchestrate actions and wield a more significant influence during negotiations with state entities, vital components in upholding peaceful protests (Kulaev 2020).

Therefore, I argue that a formal group, which does not engage its members frequently through regular meetings or other group activities, is less likely to have a significant impact. Conversely, individuals informally organized in settings like offices or religious venues might show a different dynamic. In summary, I hypothesize:

Hypothesis 3.2: The diminishing effect of formal organizational infrastructures on the risk of using violence is contingent upon the level of mobilization experience.

3.3.3 Typology of actor

In this paper, I posit that actor identity serves as a valuable proxy for discerning variations in protesters' formality and mobilisation experience. 'Actor identity' encompasses the collective attributes, characteristics, and affiliations of individuals participating in a social movement (Corrigall-Brown 2011). By analyzing this actor identity, we can glean insights into how their previous involvement in social movements and their connections to either formal or informal organizational structures influence the risks of violence.

Drawing from existing literature and empirical observations on social movements, I will begin by offering a 'cookbook'—a concise and informative overview—of the typical actors involved in nonviolent conflicts.

Dissidents, as conceptualized in this context, are civilians who partake in protest events without publicly affiliating themselves with any official group. These individuals may engage in protests either spontaneously, driven by shared grievances, or through connections within informal networks (Branch and Mampilly 2015; Kilduff and Krackhardt 2008). Such entities are not formally established and frequently lack a structured hierarchy and codified rules (Blau and Scott 1962).

The second category comprises civilians who participate in the movement while maintaining clear professional careers. While they share similarities with the first type, the events they engage in are typically organized through professional or business networks, or facilitated by

communication within their workplaces.

Young people and students stand apart from the first two categories, given their distinctive group characteristics as identified within the theory of contentious politics (Lipset 1968; Polletta 2002; Nordås and Davenport 2013). The vigor of youth can sometimes translate to a heightened rebellious streak, leading them to embrace more audacious, and occasionally, more impulsive actions (Polletta 2002; Ismail and Olonisakin 2021). In a comparative study, O'brien, Selboe, and Hayward (2018) sets youth dissent against broader forms of climate activism, pointing out that young dissenters frequently exhibit traits of being dutiful, disruptive, and potentially hazardous. This distinction is the rationale behind my decision to separate them from general dissidents and employed individuals.

Table 3.1: **Typology of actors in protests: concepts and examples**

Actor Type	**Definition**	**Examples**
Civilian Dissidents	Civilians mobilized for protest without a distinct group identity	Residents; Squatters; Voters
Individuals with Business Connections	Civilians mobilized for protest who are also employed	Lawyers; Shop Owners
Youths	Young individuals motivated to join political movements	University Students; Unemployed Youth
Civil Societies	Formal entities that coalesce people and resources, often through collective action, to achieve common goals	The April 6 Group; Don't Touch My Nationality; Islamic Movement of Nigeria
Political Parties	Organizations coordinating efforts to attain political power, whether through democratic elections or revolution	Green Algeria Alliance; Ivorian Popular Front; Social Democratic Front; Movement for the Rebirth of Cameroon
Religious and Ethnic Minorities	Participants in protest events with distinct religious or ethnic identities	Hisbah; Salafists; Bedouins; Nubians
Ex-combatants	Protesters with a military background or experience	Former Terrorists; Former Rebels

Civil societies are the main force in organizing non-violent civil resistant movements. The common civil include group like trade unions, *Student for a Democratic Society* active in the United States during the 1960s, or *Le Balai Citoyen* in Burkina Faso, or political social activists. They have diverse claims. For instance, *Le Balai Citoyen* is a political grassroots movement in opposition against the ruling government, while the Islamic movement is a religious organization which hopes to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria. They both meet the definition of

an organization, "structures designed to cohere people and resources – often through collective action – to pursue common goals" (Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020, 450). This definition is in line with what Blau and Scott (1962) refer to as two dimensions of "social organization", the networks of social relations and the shared orientations, that could "serve to organize human conduct in the collectivity". The civil organization should be officially "established" (Blau and Scott 1962, 175) to be acknowledged. This means that to accomplish "the common goals" through collective action, a specific organization is designed to coordinate activities. "[T]the rules the members of the organization are expected to follow, and the status structure that defines the relations between them (the organizational chart) have not spontaneous emerged in the course of social interaction but have been consciously designed a prior anticipate and guide interaction and activities" (Blau and Scott 1962, 175).

Political oppositions and parties often employ civil resistance methods to achieve political targets as well. By definition, a political party is a unique organization, that coordinates activities to seek political power, whether by democratic elections or by revolution (Mair and Katz 2002), such as *The Rally for Culture and Democracy* (Boukhlef 2022), a political party in Algeria, *the Movement for the Liberation of Congo* in DRC or *All Basotho Convention* in Lesotho. These political actors usually organize a demonstration or ally to protest against election fraud, poor governance, or repressive behaviours of the ruling party.

Ethno-religious minorities in the paper are defined as the individuals and groups who are elicited into protest events for promoting ethnic and religious agendas.

Last but not least, various types of former armed forces also participate in primarily nonviolent conflicts. What differentiates them from civilian dissidents or employees is their military experience or skills, similar to those of former combatants or currently-serving security forces. While they have experience in armed conflict, it's questionable whether these skills are easily transferable to civil resistance.

The above discussion of the typology is summarised in Table 3.1.

3.3.4 Heterogeneous consequences of actor typology

There exists a notable disparity in mobilization experience among different actors involved in social movements. Actors such as political opposition groups or civil organizations tend to pos-

sess higher levels of mobilization experience. These actors often engage in collective actions and have a history of sustained involvement in social movements. They reinforce the control of mobilization through regular meetings, long-term activities, and ongoing organizational structures.

Linking the actor list with the proposed theories, the differentiation between formal and informal modes of mobilization is relatively easier to identify. Civil societies and political parties are typically characterized by formal orchestration. They have established organizational structures, hierarchical systems, and clear decision-making processes. In contrast, groups such as ex-armed forces or young individuals may exhibit weaker connections and less formalized structures. Their mobilization efforts may rely more on informal networks and spontaneous actions.

In terms of mobilization experience, an actor's identity can serve as a direct indicator of such social embeddedness and act as a suitable proxy. Actors with robust inclusive group identities, like opposition parties or ethno-religious minorities, frequently exhibit heightened levels of loyalty and cohesion within their factions. Such cohesion fosters deeper connections among group members, which aids in collective mobilization (Tilly 1977). Even without a formal structure, these groups tend to engage in consistent interactions. For instance, the Berber group in Algeria holds annual remembrances and organizes various meetings, conferences, and symposiums to honor and maintain their cultural heritage (Hamdan and Kessar 2023). Christians typically congregate for Sunday church services, while Muslims assemble for Friday prayers and observe festivals like Eid. These spiritual and communal events fortify bonds among individuals sharing the same religious or cultural beliefs. Conversely, youth or general civil dissidents might gather for protests, but often without sufficient communication. While combatants have experience in strategic planning, physical resilience, and teamwork from armed conflicts, the skills required for mobilization in social movements differ. These skills include organizing groups, rallying public support, and effectively conveying messages. Though there might be some overlaps, the motivations, risks, stakes, and dynamics can vary significantly when ex-combatants participate in protests. It can be argued that they may not possess adequate mobilization experience specific to a protest setting.

Table 3.2: **Expectations on the risks of violence**

Actor Type	**Formally Organised**	**Mobilisation Experience**	**Risks of Violence**
Civilian Dissidents	No	No	High
Youths	No	No	High
Ex-combatants	No	No	High
Individuals with Business Connections	No	Yes	Medium
Religious and Ethnic Minorities	No	Yes	Medium
Political Parties	Yes	Yes	Low
Civil Societies	Yes	Yes	Low

Table 3.2 summarises my expectations on the relationship between mobilization experience and formality in relation to the actors' propensity for violence. It visually represents the anticipated differences in the likelihood of violence among actors based on their mobilization experience and formality. It highlights the varying degrees of discipline and control that different actor types may exhibit within social movements.

3.4 Data and empirical strategy

To test my propositions, I mostly rely on the SCAD dataset (Salehyan et al. 2012). SCAD provides information on different types of social unrest in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. But the spatial scope of this research is limited to Africa due to the data availability. A protest event constitutes the unit of analysis for the period 2000 - 2017. The sample includes 3591 events.

3.4.1 Outcome variable: use of violence

In the present study, I primarily focus on assessing protest violence within the realm of social movements. I posit that the criteria for classifying protest violence should be more encompassing than those applied to civil wars. Specifically, I contend that any intentional harm—whether to individuals or property—should be recognized as 'the use of violence.' Such a nuanced defi-

nition enables the inclusion of a broad spectrum of actions that, while not necessarily escalating to the level of armed conflict, are still violent in nature.

For the empirical component of this research, I rely on the Protest Violence and Targets Dataset (PVTS) (Xia 2023). This dataset augments the information found in the SCAD dataset. Consequently, for the dependent variable in my analysis, I adopt a binary classification for protester violence. Under this classification, any instance where protesters engage in violence during a social movement is coded as '1'. In instances where no violence is observed, I code it as '0'. This dichotomous categorization allows for a structured and comprehensive evaluation of the occurrence or absence of violence across diverse protest events and movements, offering a deeper insight into their underlying dynamics.

3.4.2 Independent variable: actor groups

Then, I proceed from theorising the typologies of protesters to code the actor in a event, relying on the information from SCAD. I was able to classify seven actor categories: 1) Dissidents; 2) Employed; 3) Youth; 4) Civil Societies; 5) Political Opposition; 6) Ethno-Religious Minorities; 7) Armed Forces, in accordance with the operational definition in Table 3.1. And I focus on the leading actor only, as they are normally the one who sets the tones. The cases where multiple identifiable groups co-lead and organize a protest are not as many as we expect. Only 15% of the selected SCAD sample are co-organized by several groups. And according to the NAVCO 2.1 datasets (Chenoweth and Shay 2022), 72.6% of the observation units started with organizing by an identifiable actor type. Given that most events have a predominant actor type, I will introduce a new variable later to account for the potential effect of multiple actors.

I analyze the protest events that have records of violent episodes by actor type in Figure 3.1. Notably, "Employed" group have the highest percentage of peaceful protests at 89%, followed closely by the "Political Opposition" at 80%. In contrast, the "Dissidents" category showcases an almost equal distribution between peaceful and violent protests, with 51% being peaceful and 49% being violent.

I also note significant variations in the preferences of different actors concerning how they express their grievances or advocate for social and political changes. As illustrated in Figure 3.2, it's clear that no single method of contention for achieving social or political objectives

Figure 3.1: **Frequency of using violence by actor type**



is monopolized by any specific actor category. Instead, these actors demonstrate selectivity in their chosen methods, influenced by the distinct attributes and nuances of their respective groups.

In greater detail, as seen in Figure 3.2, political opposition groups tend to engage more in demonstrations, while protesters with established careers are more inclined to use strikes as a means to express their dissatisfaction. This observation is intuitively understandable, given the distinct motivations and stakes involved for each group. It also demonstrates that these actor identities, emerging from their unique social embeddedness, exhibit similar tendencies in choosing the types of protest events to attend.

3.4.3 Control variables

In addition to the categorical independent variable, several movement-level control variables are included in the logistic regression model to account for factors that may influence the likelihood of protester violence. Firstly, the urban/rural location of the event is considered, as previous studies have shown that protests taking place in rural areas are more prone to escalating into violence (Branch and Mampilly 2015). Using categorical information on the event locality from the SCAD dataset (Salehyan et al. 2012), a binary variable *Urban* is created, where 1 indicates protests in urban areas and 0 indicates protests in rural areas.

Figure 3.2: **Actor preference for social unrest type**



The number of actors involved in civil resistance movements can significantly influence the dynamics of such movements. When multiple actors are involved, each may have their own set of beliefs, goals, and strategies. These differences can give rise to disagreements and conflicts within the movement regarding the appropriate tactics to employ and the overall direction to pursue. Some actors may prioritize nonviolent and peaceful means of resistance, while others advocate for more radical or confrontational approaches. Overall, such fragmentation could increase the risks of violence (Cunningham 2006). To account for this factor, a binary control variable is created to indicate the existence of multiple actors, based on the actor information recorded in the SCAD dataset. This variable takes a value of 1 if there are multiple actors participating in the protest event and 0 if there is only one actor.

The gender composition of the protest is also considered. To control that, I use a binary measurement to indicate whether women and girls had a prominent role in the protest event from SCAD (Salehyan et al. 2012). It is coded as 1 if: a) the primary participants in the event are organized based on female gender identity, b) the objectives of the event specifically target females, or c) the driving issue pertains exclusively to women's concerns. On the other hand, it is coded as 0 if women did not have a significant presence or influence. This control variable

is influenced by studies suggesting that female participants tend to favor creative and defensive strategies over aggressive ones in nonviolent movements, potentially fostering a more peaceful protest environment (Dahlum and Wig 2020; Ascencio, Chang, and Xia 2023).

To capture the level of organization and preparedness of the protest event, a binary variable *Organized* is created based on the categorical event type variable from the SCAD dataset (Salehyan et al. 2012). Spontaneous events are coded as 0, while well-planned events are coded as 1. This control variable aligns with recent findings emphasizing the importance of advanced preparation and elaborate orchestration in minimizing the likelihood of violent escalation (Ives and Lewis 2020; Gustafson 2020).

To capture the dynamics of state-protester interactions, I've included a control variable, *State Repression*. This variable has three values: 0, indicating no state repression; 1, denoting the use of non-lethal repression measures such as tear gas or arrests; and 2, signifying the use of lethal repression resulting in reported deaths. By taking into account the different levels of state repression, I aim to control for its potential impact on the likelihood of protester violence (Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Earl and Soule 2010). Moreover, studies such as (Nassauer 2018; Gustafson 2020) have highlighted that a loss of faith or patience can increase the risk of transitioning from civil resistance tactics to more confrontational methods. As time progresses, the initial limitations set by group dynamics and personal considerations might wane. Based on this, I argue that the duration of a civil struggle plays a significant role. As a result, I account for the number of days each event lasted. The information for these two variables also comes from SCAD (Salehyan et al. 2012).

3.5 Empirical results and discussion

To examine my hypotheses, I estimate a logistic regression on the binary measurement of protest violence in an event. The results are summarized in Table 3.3. The coefficients for each type of protester indicate the estimated differences compared to the *Civil Societies* as the reference group, as I argue that civil societies have more mobilization experiences, and are often well-structured. They are being described as the guard of the non-violence principle in civil resistance campaigns; thus the movement with their engagement shall remain peaceful.

Table 3.3: **Regression results: actor types and propensity of using violence**

	Dependent variable: protester violence (binary)		
	(Only actor variables)	(Only control variables)	(Full model)
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Dissidents	1.32***		0.43***
	(1.08,1.56)		(0.13,0.73)
Employed	−0.69***		−0.51***
	(-1.01,-0.38)		(-0.87,-0.16)
Youth	1.61***		0.77***
	(1.32,1.90)		(0.42,1.12)
Political Opposition	0.49***		0.04
	(0.20,0.77)		(-0.29,0.37)
Religious Ethnic Minorities	1.69***		0.80***
	(1.33,2.05)		(0.37,1.23)
Armed Forces	1.48***		1.47***
	(1.13,1.83)		(1.07,1.88)
Urban		−0.55***	−0.63***
		(-0.77,-0.32)	(-0.88,-0.39)
Organized		−1.71***	−1.34***
		(-1.88,-1.55)	(-1.55,-1.13)
Female Event		−2.38***	−2.46***
		(-3.10,-1.65)	(-3.27,-1.64)
State Repression		1.33***	1.28***
		(1.21,1.44)	(1.15,1.41)
Multiple Actor		−0.15	−0.09
		(-0.38,0.08)	(-0.34,0.17)
Duration		−0.01***	−0.01***
		(-0.01,-0.004)	(-0.02,-0.004)
Constant	−1.37***	−0.09	−0.50***
	(-1.57,-1.16)	(-0.30,0.13)	(-0.85,-0.14)
Observations	3,591	4,196	3,591
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,222.25	4,033.57	3,384.48

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Civil Socities as the reference group.
All models are logistic regressions.

The full model is presented in Model 3, Table 3.3. Notably, the odds ratios for the different actor types provide insights into their propensity to engage in protest violence. For example, Dissidents have an odds ratio of 1.32 ($p < 0.01$), indicating that they are 1.32 times more likely to engage in protest violence compared to civil organizations. Similarly, youth exhibit an odds ratio of 1.61 ($p < 0.01$), suggesting a higher likelihood of involvement in protest violence. On the other hand, employed individuals show an odds ratio of -0.69 ($p < 0.01$), indicating a lower likelihood of engaging in protest violence compared to civil organizations. These findings shed light on the varying degrees of association between actor types and the propensity for protest violence, contributing to our understanding of the factors influencing protest behavior.

I plot the probabilities of using violence by actor types in Figure 3.3. To highlight a few findings, the predicted probability of using violence for people with jobs is approximately 0.33. Employment status shows a significant negative association with violence in protests, suggesting that protests involving employed participants tend to be more peaceful, possibly due to a sense of stability and fewer grievances related to economic hardships.

On the other hand, the presence of youth in protests is positively associated with the likelihood of violence. In Model 1, protests with a higher proportion of young participants have a predicted probability of 62%, compared to civil society-led protests. However, this probability increases to 77% in Model 3 when controlling for other factors. Overall, these findings suggest that while youth involvement may initially contribute to a higher risk of violence, other factors play a role in moderating this association.

Overall, these findings underscore the significance of different actor types in shaping the dynamics of protester violence and provides partial support to my hypotheses. The actors with less mobilisation experience, such as dissident-led protests, protests with a significant youth presence, and those involving armed forces or religious ethnic minorities, are more likely to turn violent. In contrast, protests led by civil societies and those involving employed individuals tend to exhibit lower levels of violence. The presence of multiple actors, such as dissidents and youth, introduces diverse perspectives and potential radical flanks, increasing the risk of violence. These findings contribute to a nuanced understanding of the factors influencing protester violence and can inform strategies for promoting nonviolent forms of protest.

Figure 3.3: **Predicted probabilities of using violence by actor type, Model 3**



Note: Each dot represents the predicted probability of each actor, and the horizontal bars extending from each dot denote the 95% confidence interval.

In Model 3, the inclusion of additional control variables further strengthens the findings and aligns with theoretical expectations. Firstly, the results indicate that the likelihood of protester violence decreases when the protest event takes place in urban areas. The coefficient for the *Urban* variable is negative and significant, indicating that protests occurring in urban areas have a lower propensity for violence compared to protests in rural areas. This finding supports previous research that suggests urban environments may offer more opportunities for peaceful expression of grievances and the presence of formal institutions that can mediate conflicts.

Furthermore, the results highlight the importance of female-led movements in maintaining nonviolent tactics. The coefficient for the *Female Event* variable is negative and highly significant, indicating that protests led by women are associated with a decreased likelihood of violence. This finding supports the empowerment of peace hypothesis, which suggests that female-led movements prioritize nonviolent means of protest (Wood and Ramirez 2018; Ascencio, Chang, and Xia 2023).

The coefficient for the variable measuring the organization level of the event also remains significant and increases in magnitude. This indicates that when protests are well-organized and planned, the propensity for violent tactics among participants decreases. This finding is consistent with previous research that emphasizes the importance of advanced preparation and elaborate orchestration in reducing the likelihood of violent escalation (Ives and Lewis 2020).

Organized protests may have established communication channels, clear goals, and strategies, which promote coordination and nonviolent collective action.

3.6 Robustness check

3.6.1 Sub-sample analysis

In addition, I conduct the same analyses within sub-sample. The original datasets includes three types of social conflicts, demonstrations, riot and strike. By considering organized and spontaneous demonstrations as two separate sub-samples, we can identify potential heterogeneity in the effects and assess the robustness of the relationship across different contexts. The results of logistic regression in organized demonstrations (in Model 4) and spontaneous demonstrations (in Model 5) are reported in Table 3.4.

Figure 3.4 provides a comparison of the likelihood of protest violence among distinct actor categories, using civil societies as the reference group. Significantly, actors who participate in protests representing their work identity display a reduced propensity to engage in protest violence. In contrast, those protesting due to general grievances without formal organization—as referred to as the dissident category—have an increased tendency towards violence. Consistently, these patterns hold robust across various event samples, providing further credibility of my earlier findings. It's particularly noteworthy that well-organized religious or ethnic groups exhibit a marked decrease in violent tendencies compared to when they act spontaneously. This trend, to a degree, correlates with the "emotion-driven" argument (Nassauer 2018). Such communities, which are frequently marginalized systemically, might perceive violence as a crucial means to highlight their grievances (Thurber 2018), particularly when taking to the streets spontaneously, driven by intense emotions or frustration. However, once they have a plan in place, the strong community cohesion and years of effort in protesting against institutionalized injustice will reinforce their commitment to the principle of non-violence.

To validate my findings further, I utilize the Social Conflict Analysis Database – Organizational Properties (SCAD-Ops) (Salehyan, Feinberg, and Naughton 2020) to test my hypotheses. Rather than testing at the campaign level, I examine it at the actor-level to determine if my theories hold. The results, which can be found in Appendix 3A, are consistent with my earlier

Table 3.4: **Regression results - subsample: demonstration**

	Dependent variable: protester violence (binary)	
	Model 4	Model 5
	Organized demonstrations	Spontaneous demonstrations
Dissidents	0.86^{***}	0.79^{***}
	(0.22,1.51)	(0.21,1.37)
Employed	-0.34	-0.40
	(-1.34,0.67)	(-1.16,0.37)
Youth	0.22	0.89^{***}
	(-0.68,1.11)	(0.24,1.54)
Political Opposition	0.02	0.13
	(-0.47,0.50)	(-0.60,0.86)
Religious Ethnic Minorities	-0.85	0.91^{**}
	(-2.93,1.23)	(0.18,1.63)
Armed Forces	1.56^{***}	0.68
	(0.81,2.32)	(-0.22,1.57)
Urban	-0.07	-0.42^{**}
	(-0.87,0.73)	(-0.79,-0.05)
Female Event	-1.95^{***}	-2.93^{***}
	(-3.21,-0.69)	(-4.39,-1.47)
State Repression	1.12^{***}	1.26^{***}
	(0.82,1.43)	(1.07,1.45)
Multiple Actor	-0.42^{*}	0.41^{*}
	(-0.88,0.04)	(-0.02,0.84)
Duration	0.005	-0.01^{**}
	(-0.01,0.02)	(-0.02,-0.001)
Constant	-2.32^{***}	-1.72^{***}
	(-3.19,-1.46)	(-2.39,-1.05)
Observations	819	1,320
Akaike Inf. Crit.	694.75	1,394.16

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Civil Socities as the reference group

Figure 3.4: **Comparing the risk of using violence across protest event types by different actors**



Note: Each dot indicates the predicted probability for a given actor type. The horizontal bars represent the 95% confidence interval for that prediction.

findings.

3.6.2 Comparative case studies

While the results receive partial support from the empirical tests and robustness checks, I recognize the limitations of using actor identity as a proxy for actors' organizational formality and mobilization experience. Proxy measurements, such as the one employed here, can be valuable for gaining insights, particularly when direct measures are challenging to obtain (Knox, Lucas, and Cho 2022). However, it's crucial to note that they are indirect and might not capture the full precision of the intended measure, potentially introducing more uncertainty into the estimates (Knox, Lucas, and Cho 2022). To address this concern, I will present a comparative case study to better illustrate my expectations regarding the effect of formal networks, moderated by an actor's mobilization experience. Recalling the definition of mobilization experience in this paper – experience gained through continuous participation in social movements – I have selected two political organizations that led several rounds of protests during the Arab Spring: the April 6 Youth Movement in Egypt and the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia.

The April 6 Youth Movement was established in 2008 to support the workers in El-Mahalla

El-Kubra, an industrial town (Lim 2012). Later, it played a significant role in the protests against the regime of former President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt (BBC 2011). It was a key mobilizing force during the 2011 Egyptian revolution, utilizing social media and grassroots organizing to rally the masses and call for political change. As of January 2009, it had 70,000 predominantly young and educated members, most of whom had not been politically active before (Shapiro 2009).

As for the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia, it was founded in 1981, inspired by the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood. It grows as a political group with a long history of opposition to the former authoritarian regime and had been involved in various rounds of protests and political activities (Yildirim 2017). Later it emerged as a prominent political force and was legalized as a political party in 2011 during the Arab Spring. The basic information about these two cases is summarised in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5: **Basic case information**

	April 6 Youth Movement	**Ennahda Movement**
Country	Egypt	Tunisia
Founded Time	2008	1981
Other Names	None	Movement of Islamic Tendency; Renaissance Party
Political Ideology	Liberal Islamism	Liberal Democratic Islamism
Periodic Meetings	No	Yes
Pre-Arab Spring Experience of Political Activism	Limited	Yes
Mobilization Method	Through Social Media Platforms	Traditional Pathways like Rallies and Preaching

Simply recalling the time when these two political organizations were established can already provide insights into the differences in their mobilization experiences. However, delving into more nuanced details further exemplifies this disparity. For instance, within the Ennahda Movement, several leaders have consistently expressed their determination to educate and mobilize their followers (Yildirim 2017). This strategic focus on mobilization has shaped their approach and fostered a sense of collective purpose.

Turning our attention to the April 6 Youth Movement, its emergence and growth occurred in

a digital era, significantly altering the landscape of mobilization (Lance Bennett, Breunig, and Givens 2008). The movement harnessed the capabilities of social media platforms, using them as hubs for discussions around group behaviors before and during the Arab Spring (Lim 2012). This digital connectivity allowed for rapid dissemination of information, helping mobilize people who have less experience of being politically active (Shapiro 2009; Lim 2012). However, an increasing in the number of mobilized participants leads to a trade-off between the capacity to amass a significant number of individuals and the challenge of upholding rigorous group discipline. The digital mobilization of masses introduces an additional layer of complexity, particularly evident in the case of the April 6 Youth Movement (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011). This digital prowess, while amplifying their reach and influence, also places a considerable demand on the movement's resources and capabilities.

As the movement harnesses online platforms to muster support, its ability to attract a larger audience becomes apparent. Yet, this digital engagement necessitates adept management, coordination, and communication, facets that can be demanding for a relatively youthful organization like the April 6 Youth Movement. The convergence of these factors reveals an intricate interplay between the advantages of expansive mobilization and the potential strain it imposes on a fledgling group. Among peaceful efforts, gradual violent episodes and clashes started to emerge (European Country of Origin Information Network 2011) and heightened in subsequent movements organized by members of the April 6 Youth Movement after the Arab Spring (Online 2013; Shukrallah et al. 2013). This outcome can be attributed to strong state repression and the group's limited mobilization experience, which hindered them from resorting to alternative strategies. The less effective communication even led to the group being plagued with issues of fragmentation (El Sayed 2014).

In comparison, the Ennahda Movement adopts a deliberate strategy to continuously mobilize its group members by promoting the teaching and practice of a pure form of Islam (Meddeb 2019). The inception of this Tunisian political Islamist movement is characterized by its encouragement of both preaching and political activism since the 1960s (Meddeb 2019). It operates based on a public charter whereby representatives are elected to a general conference. This conference then elects some members to the Shura Council, which subsequently forms a smaller

Political Bureau to mitigate the risks of internal fragmentation (Patel 2022). During Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution, Ennahda members collaborated with unions, bar associations, and opposition parties to coordinate demonstrations and protests, rapidly spreading them across all regions of Tunisia and thereby destabilizing the Ben Ali government. In the face of such swift and expansive political changes, the Ennahda Movement quickly adapted to the process due to its superior organizational skills compared to other opposition movements (Yildirim 2017). Eventually, unlike its counterparts in Egypt, as well as in Libya, Yemen, and Syria, Tunisia's uprising inaugurated a largely peaceful transition. This also explains why the Ennahda Movement was able to reactivate grassroots networks and reform the movement's organizational structures into party competition and later secure a victory in the election.

This comparative analysis sheds light on the relationship between mobilization experience and the risks of protest violence. The nuanced differences in the experiences of the April 6 Youth Movement and the Ennahda Movement highlight how varying organizational approaches, mobilization capabilities, and strategic adaptations can profoundly influence the outcomes of protest movements during periods of political transformation.

3.7 Conclusion

In the conclusion, this paper's actor-oriented analysis of the catalysts for protester violence sheds light on the critical role played by well-functioning organizations with mobilization experience in promoting peaceful expressions of grievances. By examining the dynamics of various actor types and their organizational structures, my research contributes significantly to the growing body of literature on organizational dynamics and nonviolent social conflicts with statistical analyses and substantial empirical evidence.

The practical implications of my findings are particularly noteworthy. It suggests that unstructured protest groups would benefit from investing in the development of formal organizational infrastructure. Establishing clear organizational structures, leadership roles, and channels of communication can enhance discipline and coordination among participants, ultimately leading to greater peace and overall success in achieving movement objectives. Furthermore, fostering effective communication between different protesting groups and factions is crucial

for promoting cooperation and strategic coordination, reducing the likelihood of intra-group conflicts and divergent tactics. While spontaneous movements may initially gather significant momentum, their lack of formal organization and coordination make them susceptible to setbacks, errors, and a subsequent decline in popularity.

However, despite the valuable insights gained from my study, several important questions remain unanswered, opening up promising avenues for future research. In addition to mobilization experience, it is essential to explore other factors that may contribute to the observed variations in the effect sizes across different actor types. Factors such as the sociopolitical context, resource availability, and external support could influence the efficacy of organizational structures in promoting nonviolent tactics. Additionally, investigating the factors that influence protesters' decisions regarding the targets of violence can provide valuable insights into their motivations and behavioral dynamics. Understanding why certain groups or individuals resort to violence against specific targets can help inform strategies for conflict resolution and violence prevention.

An important limitation of this study revolves around the application of actor typology as a substitute for key group characteristics. It's imperative to recognize the inherent uncertainty concerning the degree to which this typology genuinely encapsulates the core essence of mobilization experience. I readily acknowledge that this might not be the most ideal approach, given the potential limitations of observable types aligning precisely with the intricate and nuanced dimensions of actual group features. However, this also introduce a new avenue of inquiry: how we can effectively and innovatively measure mobilization experience, accounting for the new changes brought about by the digital era.

In summary, my research underscores the significance of organizational infrastructure and effective communication in shaping the outcomes of protests. By addressing the unanswered questions and delving into the suggested extensions, future studies can further enhance our understanding of the dynamics of protester violence and contribute to the advancement of peaceful and effective social movements. By focusing on the interplay between organizational dynamics, mobilization experience, and strategic decision-making, we can strive towards more informed and evidence-based approaches to promoting nonviolent means of expressing grievances and

achieving social change.

3.8 Appendix 3A: Actor-level analysis

To further increase confidence in the results, I rely on the Social Conflict Analysis Database – Organizational Properties (SCAD-Ops) (Salehyan, Feinberg, and Naughton 2020) to test my hypothesis at the actor level. The SCAD-Ops dataset records actors and targets listed in the original SCAD data but is limited to Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa. The data cover the time period from 1990 to 2016, and the observation unit is the actor-campaign.

I applied the same coding scheme for actor typology as shown in Table 3.1 to recreate the actor variable. To measure the usage of violence, I rely on the *etype* variable. If the event organized by the actor is a violent riot, it is coded as 1, indicating the use of violence. It is coded as 0 if the event type is a demonstration or a general/limited strike. In the full model, I include almost the same group of control variables. The minor difference is that I exclude the variable *female event* as it is not coded for SCAD-OPs (Salehyan, Feinberg, and Naughton 2020). In addition, I include a control variable for the coherence of the actors to see whether an actor/target is distinctive enough to be accurately traced across multiple events as a singular actor/target. This is a good indicator to control for the increased risks of violence by a fragmented group (Pearlman and Cunningham 2012). It is coded as 1 if groups, individuals, and organizations have a unique, consistent identity over time, coded as 0 if it is not.

The regression results can be found in Table 3.6. Additionally, Figure 3.5 plots the coefficients of the explanatory variables from Model 8 in Table 3.6. The patterns of violence risk by actors still hold.

Table 3.6: **Regression results: actor-level analysis**

	Dependent variable: violent resistance		
	(Only actor variables)	(Only control variables)	(Full model)
	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Dissidents	1.75^{***}		0.83^{***}
	(0.20)		(0.22)
Employed	0.51^{**}		0.33
	(0.22)		(0.24)
Youth	2.07^{***}		1.30^{***}
	(0.21)		(0.24)
Political Opposition	0.78^{***}		0.65^{***}
	(0.23)		(0.25)
Religious Ethnic Minorities	2.60^{***}		1.78^{***}
	(0.22)		(0.24)
Armed Forces	3.33^{***}		2.74^{***}
	(0.22)		(0.25)
Urban		-0.91^{***}	-0.95^{***}
		(0.08)	(0.10)
Organized		-1.99^{***}	-2.03^{***}
		(0.12)	(0.17)
Coherence		0.06	0.71^{***}
		(0.15)	(0.22)
Multiple Actor		-0.66^{***}	-0.59^{***}
		(0.13)	(0.15)
State Repression		0.37^{***}	0.51^{***}
		(0.05)	(0.06)
Duration		-0.01^{***}	-0.01^{**}
		(0.004)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.33^{***}	0.51^{***}	-0.74^{***}
	(0.19)	(0.08)	(0.23)
Observations	3,727	4,810	3,727
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,171.70	5,309.27	3,727.85

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Civil Socities as the reference group

Figure 3.5: **Appendix: comparing the risk of using violence by different actors, Model 8**



Note: Each dot indicates the predicted probability for a given actor type. The horizontal bars represent the 95% confidence interval for that prediction.

Chapter 4

Exploring Gender Dynamics in Anti-Government Movements: Shaping the Choice Between Violent and Civil Resistance

The existing literature has examined why non-state challengers within anti-government movements adopt violent tactics while others choose civil resistance. However, the role of gender in influencing these choices has received relatively little attention. This paper seeks to address the gap in research by examining the potential impact of female engagement on the likelihood of employing nonviolent tactics in contentious movements. The paper argues that movements with higher levels of female participation are more likely to employ civil resistance tactics due to internalized social behaviors and the societal repercussions women face for deviating from norms. Empirical analysis of 338 maximalist resistance campaigns spanning from 1945 to 2014, combined with a case study of anti-government protests in Ivory Coast during 2010-2011, provides substantial evidence in support of these claims. The findings emphasize that the use of nonviolent tactics is significantly correlated with female participation, rather than the presence of a gender-inclusive attitude.

4.1 Introduction

Understanding the factors that drive divergent paths within anti-government movements, specifically the choice between violence and civil resistance, is crucial for both scholars and practitioners. Previous research has shed light on individual and group attributes, such as emotion (Gustafson 2020), socioeconomic background (Dahlum 2019), or ethnic structure (Thurber 2018), that could influence the decision to use violence. The findings from previous studies are fruitful, but the heterogeneity of gender is not fully explored.

However, it is noteworthy that examples of women finding peaceful solutions in challenging situations are not rare and have garnered significant attention in other research strands. A substantial body of literature in gender and politics studies has demonstrated gender variations in risk management, policy preferences, and general social behaviors (Eagly and Wood 1991; Conover and Sapiro 1993; Brooks and Valentino 2011; Koch and Fulton 2011; Barnhart et al. 2020; Sergent and Stajkovic 2020).

Some compelling cases suggest that women's participation significantly influences the trajectories of anti-government campaigns, often favoring nonviolent resistance. For example, street protests erupted in Sudan in December 2018, driven by demands for economic reforms and the resignation of President al-Bashir (Walsh and Goldstein 2019). As civil disobedience persisted, confrontations between protesters and security forces escalated in brutality. Notably, in the face of this violence, women distinguished themselves by advocating for peaceful mobilization (Friedman 2019).

A 22-year-old woman named Alaa Salah has emerged as a prominent figure in this civil revolution. A photograph capturing her standing atop a car, draped in a white thoub and passionately calling for peace, ignited the enthusiasm of the Sudanese people to remain peaceful in this movement. She has since become an iconic symbol, often likened to the Sudanese Statue of Liberty (Griffin 2019). Subsequently, more women have chosen to dress in white during the protests and are affectionately referred to as 'Kandakas.' This term draws inspiration from the ancient Nubian queens[1], symbolizing the power of women and their pivotal role in leading the

1. Nubian queens refer to queens from the ancient Nubian civilization, which existed in the region of modern-day Sudan and southern Egypt. Kandake is a specific title for the Nubian queens. The term "Nubian queens" is often used to refer to powerful and influential female rulers from Nubian history, and it can symbolize the strength

protests toward a peaceful resolution (Friedman 2019).

Additional instances in Cote d'Ivoire, Korea, and South Africa suggest that anti-government campaigns with women at the forefront and a higher proportion of female followers tend to exhibit distinct behavioral and tactical patterns. Therefore, it becomes vital to consider gender heterogeneity when explaining the choice of the civil resistance path.

Building upon the theories of gender socialization and societal expectations (Eagly and Wood 1991; Koch and Fulton 2011), this paper argues that female participation influences the likelihood of initiating either a violent or civil resistance campaign [2]. The reasons for this influence are as follows. Firstly, due to prevailing social norms and expectations regarding women's roles in the domestic realm, they tend to prioritize peace over engaging in violent actions (Wood and Ramirez 2018). Even in cases where women increasingly participate in political conflicts, they may still be influenced by their traditional roles (Bado and Kendhammer, n.d.; Beyer and Kojobekova 2020). Therefore, as they often play crucial roles as facilitators and in fostering cross-community networks, I argue that women can serve as stabilizing forces in protests. The second aspect of this explanation focuses on the potential severe social backlash against female perpetrators (Ascencio, Chang, and Xia 2023), leading them to strategically adhere to civil resistance tactics.

Then, the argument delves into the relationship between gender and protest tactics by examining how women interact with two actors, the state and male counterparts respectively. On the one hand, women tend to respond to aggression and provocation by avoiding physical confrontations (McDermott 2015), making them more inclined to advocate for peaceful approaches when faced with threats from the state. On the other hand, given the higher reputation cost that men incur when opposing women's calls for peace, it is rational for them to adopt civil tactics. In summary, this paper posits that movements with a higher proportion of female members are more inclined towards nonviolent resistance.

To test this hypothesis, I primarily use data that links the maximalist movements[3] from the

and leadership of women in the context of modern protests and movements (Ashby 2021).

2. I would like to emphasize here that gender socialization theory is based on gendered behaviors, not exclusively on biological sex. The argument in this essay does not support an essentialist viewpoint; instead, it aims to highlight how individuals develop social expectations and their own behaviors concerning gender.

3. A maximalist resistance campaign is defined as a campaign that calls for the toppling of an oppressive government or territorial self-determination (Chenoweth and Shay 2022).

Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.1 dataset (Chenoweth and Shay 2022) with the Women in Resistance (WiRe) dataset (Chenoweth 2019). The analyses indicate that movements with a more pronounced female presence have a significant and positive impact on the likelihood of initiating a nonviolent campaign. Moreover, checks for alternative mechanisms reveal that this effect is specific to having a substantial female presence; the gender agenda or demands do not show any consistent impact. I recognize the scope limitations of this study, as the test focuses specifically on the subset of maximalist anti-government movements. This focus could raise questions about external validity. To address these concerns and ensure the robustness of my findings, I have conducted supplementary robustness checks. And to acknowledge the limitations in empirical testing, this paper presents a case study of women's movements in Ivory Coast. This case provides evidence that when women are given new but limited opportunities to participate in political campaigns historically dominated by men, they expand their roles in social life and introduce fresh dynamics into these movements. Additionally, it demonstrates how women respond to the state's brutal behaviors by advocating for more peaceful approaches within the movement.

The present study makes three significant contributions. Firstly, it extends previous research on reducing the risks of violence and escalation in protest events, as supported by studies such as Karakaya (2018), Thurber (2018), and Sullivan (2019). This paper goes a step further by explicitly focusing on the gender heterogeneity among movement participants. The findings enrich our understanding of factors that can mitigate the likelihood of violence.

Secondly, my research emphasizes the critical importance of incorporating gender dynamics into the analysis of collective action and social movements, as highlighted in studies such as Safa (1990), Robnett (1996), Einwohner, Hollander, and Olson (2000), Kuumba (2001), Yulia (2010), and Sjoberg and Whooley (2015). By examining the role of gender, this study offers a more comprehensive perspective on the motivations and dynamics of social activism.

Third, this research makes valuable contributions to both theoretical understanding and practical insights into the sustainability of peaceful protests. The implications of its findings strongly advocate for increased female participation in social movements, highlighting the positive impact of women's involvement in advancing nonviolent approaches to social and political

change. These insights are particularly relevant for activists and organizers dedicated to furthering their causes through nonviolent strategies. In summary, by exploring the role of women and their contributions to civil resistance, my study emphasizes the importance of incorporating female perspectives and experiences into activism. This inclusion enriches the discourse on effective collective action and the promotion of peaceful social change.

4.2 Literature review

While many protest events are peaceful, some escalate into violent confrontations between protesters and law enforcement or other groups. The existing literature on why protest events become violent is extensive and uncovers a range of factors contributing to the likelihood of violence.

One key factor is the level of state repression faced by protesters (Rasler 1996; Demirel-Pegg 2020). Steinert-Threlkeld, Chan, and Joo (2022) examine a violent spiral of escalation in protests: states may use violence to suppress protests or respond with excessive force to perceived threats. The presence of militarized law enforcement, the use of tear gas and rubber bullets, and the deployment of the military in response to protests can also increase the likelihood of violence (Della Porta and Fillieule 2004; Anisin 2016). In addition, state capacity also explains the likelihood of protest violence (Sullivan 2019). Using data on Mexican protest events in 2005, Sullivan (2019) finds that when people have lower trust in the state and its authority, the presence of more police at the scene increases the probability of violence. More findings are centered around the country context. Butcher and Svensson (2016) find that the onset of nonviolent resistance is robustly predicted by the share of a country's economy that consists of manufacturing. Karakaya (2018) finds that countries with higher levels of globalization are more likely to experience nonviolent resistance movements.

Another factor to take into account is the level of organization and leadership within the protest movement (Pearlman 2012; Ives and Lewis 2020). A lack of clear leaders or a unified strategy can lead to confusion and chaos, increasing the likelihood of violence. On the other hand, the presence of organized and charismatic leaders can help control the protest and de-escalate potential conflicts. There are more organizational-level explanations. Belgioioso

(2018) finds that having more protest groups lead to intensified competition within and outside an organization. Under such pressure, leaders from mass civil resistance campaigns may resort to violent tactics to secure organizational survival.

The issue being protested and the group identity of protesters also play a role in determining the likelihood of violence. Protests centered around issues of high emotional and political salience, such as police brutality or government corruption, are more likely to turn violent. Protests by marginalized groups, such as racial or ethnic minorities, are also more likely to become violent due to systemic oppression and a lack of appropriate political channels (Davenport 2015).

The group ideology and the presence of violent factions and agitators should not be underestimated (Porta and Tarrow 1986; Nassauer 2019; Ryckman 2020; Belgioioso, Costalli, and Gleditsch 2021). Some groups may intentionally provoke violence, believing in the strategic value of using violence. Moreover, violence can also serve as a signaling function of their strong resolve and claims.

Most researchers theorize with gender-neutral terms, not adequately acknowledging gender differences. The underlying assumption is that the factors explaining violent and aggressive actions affect male and female protesters similarly. Only a few studies consider the impact of gender dynamics on the risks of violence. Based on gendered socialization, social positions, and societal expectations, it is evident that men and women often behave differently. Economists have found that women tend to be more risk-averse than men (Croson and Gneezy 2009). Additionally, women exhibit greater variability in their behaviors compared to men, as they are more sensitive to social cues (Croson and Gneezy 2009). Furthermore, women tend to have lower preferences for competitive situations than men (Croson and Gneezy 2009).

In the field of gender politics, the literature has expanded our understanding of the pronounced effect of gender differences in the political sphere. An important finding is that women are more likely to contribute to peace (Koch and Fulton 2011; Bjarnegård and Melander 2017; Cohen and Karim 2022). For instance, increases in women's legislative representation decrease conflict behavior and defense spending (Koch and Fulton 2011). Piscopo and Och (2021) find that women leaders insist on their policy priorities, unaffected by adverse policy environments

and hyper-masculine chief executives. Later on, researchers argue that it is not biological sex but positive attitudes toward gender equality that can reduce hostilities between international rivals (Bjarnegård and Melander 2017). The literature on women in armed conflicts is also growing (Henshaw 2016; Wood and Thomas 2017; Wood and Allemang 2022; Başer 2022; Loken and Matfess 2022; Mehrl 2022). These findings suggest that women are peaceful, resourceful, and resilient. Female rebels decrease civilian victimization because they are better able to peacefully engage with and obtain resources and information from civilians (Mehrl 2022). Furthermore, women have unique potential in maintaining organizations, such as rebel groups, ensuring that they continue to function effectively even in challenging situations (Başer 2022; Wood and Allemang 2022).

However, such differences and their influence are not fully acknowledged in nonviolent conflict dynamics, leaving important questions unanswered. This paper aims to highlight the importance of women in the protest movement, as well as the underrepresentation of women's activism and its impact. Among the missing pieces in the studies exploring the relationship between gender and civil resistance, this paper focuses on examining the effect of women on sustaining peaceful protest movements.

4.3 Theory

The central thesis of my argument is that women's participation contributes to the maintenance of peaceful protest events. The underlying mechanism is derived from insights in gender studies, particularly related to socialization and societal expectations. In this regard, I will initially offer two explanations for why women tend to favor civil resistance. Subsequently, I will delve into the interactions between women and state actors, as well as male members within the movement, to elucidate why women's preference for peace matters

4.3.1 Gender gap in preference for violence/peace

The first explanation operates on the assumption that gender differences in social roles and behaviors are substantial. These distinctions are the result of culturally and socially constructed norms that dictate how men and women should behave and interact within society. These norms can vary widely across countries and cultural contexts (Bjarnegård and Melander 2017), and

it's important to note that women are not a monolithic group. Nevertheless, we can identify some shared intercultural traits.

In general, women tend to prefer peace over violence and are more opposed to any form of violence compared to men (Conover and Sapiro 1993; Charlesworth 2008; Sjoberg 2013). There are several popular explanations for this gender difference. One explanation suggests that men are inherently more aggressive than women due to certain physical features (Burris, 1992), while others argue that women's innate moral values and their sense of moral superiority influence their aversion to violence and criminal behavior (Okin 1990).

However, this paper aligns with the social role explanation: most societies primarily position women as caretakers and nurturers, a concept often referred to as "Motherhood" in gender studies (Conover and Sapiro 1993). Motherhood and peace are often linked (Swerdlow 1993). Being a mother refers to the role and responsibilities of raising and caring for a child. It involves physical, emotional, and mental investment in the child's growth and well-being. This can include tasks such as feeding, clothing, and nurturing the child, as well as providing guidance, support, and discipline. These gender norms around motherhood and how to be a mother are learned and internalized from a young age, shaping women's attitudes toward and responses to issues of violence.

Women embrace their motherly identity and female peculiarities in the political arena (Piscopo and Och 2021) and during protests (Jacob 2022). Studies on violence and wars confirm their general preference for peace. For instance, greater female representation in political institutions tends to promote peace as a policy choice (Conover and Sapiro 1993; Brooks and Valentino 2011; Koch and Fulton 2011; Cockburn 2013; Hughes and Tripp 2015; Shair-Rosenfield and Wood 2017). When it comes to factors that successfully mobilize female protesters, the call to end violence (Zulver 2016) or wars (Swerdlow 1993) is the most traditional and effective catalyst. Further evidence is found in studies on women's unique contributions to conflict management (Samuel, Skjelsbaek, and Smith 2001) and sustainable peace (Krause, Krause, and Bränfors 2018; Mbabazi, Naiga, and Helen 2020). This preference for peace is also reflected in the landmark policy, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, which acknowledges the crucial role of women in peace negotiations and conflict resolution.

Organizations like the "Mother Front" during the Sri Lankan Civil War serve as prime examples of how women can leverage their gendered roles of motherhood positively to advocate for peace and address the limitations of traditional male-dominated forms of protest, which may be ineffective or impossible due to political violence and terror (Samuel, Skjelsbaek, and Smith 2001). Overall, the preference for peace among women is a widely observed phenomenon, and the presence of more female figures in a protest event often signals a commitment to peace.

4.3.2 Women in social movements as glue

Whether actors can continue to adhere to the path of nonviolent resistance also depends on their ability to maintain cohesion and nonviolent discipline (Thurber 2019). Referring to previous findings, disorder within a civil resistance movement increases the risk of protester violence (Ives and Lewis 2020), while a cohesive movement enjoys better organizational capacity to mobilize mass participation, manage disruptive dissent, and limit violence (Pearlman 2012). In this section, I will examine the role of women in leaderless grassroots movements and how they effectively contribute to the solidarity among participants.

Women and men have expanded their traditional roles in society to encompass the workplace, the battlefield, negotiation tables, and even protest movements. While it is widely acknowledged that women are equally capable as men in various fields, the prevailing trend often sees women assuming roles that involve providing 'care, comfort, support, and encouragement to the male warriors,' roles that often align with societal norms and cultural expectations (Wood 2019, 2). Further research indicates that due to their closer connection to domestic spheres, women are more likely to mobilize at the grassroots and community levels (Yulia 2010). This helps explain women's aptitude for building networks (Parkinson 2013) and why they often serve as social facilitators in leaderless groups (Eagly and Wood 1991).

Similarly, I posit that during protest events, women often spontaneously engage in support activities, even without prior coordination, frequently contributing to stabilization. This inclination is particularly evident in larger, spontaneous, and less structured social movements. For instance, during the Arab Spring (MEPC 2023),

"*In Egypt's Tahrir Square, volunteer women, some accompanied by children, consistently supported the protests — aiding in security, communications, and shelter. Many commentators*

attributed the significant presence of women and children to the notable overall peacefulness of the protesters, despite severe provocations."

An interviewee from Ukraine's EuroMaidan once stated, "We were there to take care of the movement, and in doing so, our country. While some people may see us merely as cleaners and cooks, we were so much more than that. Women were the glue that held this movement together and enabled its success" (Nikolayenko and DeCasper 2018, 746). Once again, women and girls volunteered to assume roles in maintaining the movement, effectively extending their traditional societal roles (Yulia 2010). The solidarity and leadership skills honed through daily household chores played a crucial role in steering and sustaining the peaceful mobilization. This also explains why women excel in building cross-community coalitions to promote peace (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). During the 24-hour sit-ins at the Shaheen Bagh protest, the solidarity and mutual support among women became evident as they helped each other with domestic responsibilities (Chopra 2021). These factors further bolstered their determination to voice their claims publicly and peacefully.

4.3.3 Prejudiced social backlash against women as violence perpetrators

The second explanation underscores the significance of strategic choices individuals make when faced with the potential consequences of deviating from social norms. It acknowledges that, although women may generally prefer peaceful means of resistance, it does not want to make an essentialist claim suggesting that women are inherently predisposed to peacefulness. Furthermore, the existing literature on armed conflict (e.g., Speckhard and Akhmedova 2006; Gonzalez-Perez 2008; Coulter 2008; Bloom 2011) has demonstrated that women can actively engage in violent attacks in some situation. While this section recognizes the potential for women to participate in violence during protests[4], it aims to provide arguments explaining why they might strategically opt for nonviolent tactics. The central argument posits that, by adopting nonviolent strategies, women can effectively navigate the complexities of participating in political conflicts while concurrently mitigating potential backlash or reprisals rooted in

4. For instance, feminists calling for greater protections for women in Mexico engaged in violent clashes with security forces and set a government building on fire (Agren 2021). However, Ascencio, Chang, and Xia (2023) find that the use of violence by women in social movements is often conditional.

gender-based biases. This strategic decision-making process represents an additional influential factor that shapes women's participation in civil resistance.

Generally, patriarchal social orders expect women to be docile and lenient, confining them to the domestic sphere and fostering societal expectations regarding women's behavior. Despite efforts towards empowerment, progress towards gender equality has been slow, and in some cases, there have been setbacks (Roggeband, Krizsán, et al. 2020). In Africa, women are traditionally and socially regarded as embodiments of sanctity, dignity, morality, and purity (Ikelegbe 2005, 259). Women are expected to be patient figures in their communities (Ikelegbe 2005). In countries like Rwanda, which is known for valuing gender equality and having a significant number of women in government, there is still a disparity, as "no matter how powerful these women were in public, that power didn't extend into their own homes" (Warner 2016). A "good" wife is expected to be submissive and subservient to the men in the household. Women are not inherently passive, but traditional constructions of gender identity are reinforced through socialization processes.

When women deviate from social stereotypes and engage in violence, they often face harsher penalties as a consequence. This means that if women resort to violence, they are likely to experience stronger social backlash (Sjoberg and Gentry 2008). For instance, there is extensive press coverage of domestic violence statistics that claim women initiate violence against their partners as frequently as men, or the use of anti-conspiracy laws that specifically target the wives and partners of drug dealers, holding them accountable for their involvement in or concealment of crimes (Van Wormer 2008). Additionally, discrimination against females can be observed in some procedural criminal codes. Some laws prescribe reduced sentences for predominantly male perpetrators who kill in response to provocation caused by the behavior of their wives or female relatives, while requiring aggravated sentences for predominantly female perpetrators who kill their abusers with premeditation (UNODC 2019).

Acting outside of inherited gender expectations also punishes female fighters who left battlefields. Recent research from Hauge (2020) shows that female fighters will usually experience more stigmatization and social exclusion from the local community than male ex-combatants. Local communities might have their own "moral gatekeepers" who determine what is accept-

able and what is not with regard to traditional gender roles (Mano-Negrin and Sheaffer 2004; Hauge 2020) and female ex-combatants are more likely to be marginalized by the local community. The studies around soldier recidivism support this conclusion. The postwar marginalization that was faced by the female ex-combatants also suggests that they are being punished due to becoming a threat to the existing social political and even ideological culture. Such threat is formed through their acting violent and destabilizing the gender roles. Overall, these reflect the general biased response to women when they are the perpetrators of violent crime.

An experimental study conducted by Ascencio, Chang, and Xia (2023) has strongly supported this argument. Their studies have shown that public support decreases more significantly when violence in protests is attributed to women, compared to men. This finding suggests that women are more likely to recognize the benefits of maintaining nonviolent tactics. The prevailing social norm, which places pressure on women to adopt nonviolent approaches, may eventually lead female protesters to collectively choose peaceful means of expression.

4.3.4 Gender difference in responses to state's violence

In the following sections, I will delve into two interactions involving female protesters. The first interaction pertains to the relationship between women and state actors. State authorities sometimes opt to use force against female protesters, as documented in studies such as Ikelegbe (2005) and Mason (2005). For instance, the female-led nonviolent resistance within the East Timorese national liberation movement against Indonesia was met with highly violent responses from Indonesian troops, including instances of rape and sexual exploitation. Similarly, in Sudan, security forces deliberately harass and assault female activists to tarnish their reputation and shame their families, often invoking the notion that "good girls do not protest" (Human Rights Watch 2016).

However, there exists a gender-related variation in how individuals respond to such violent provocations. Research indicates that men are more likely to express their hostility through physical means, while women are less inclined to overtly channel their anger and grief (McDermott 2015). This implies that women are less prone to resort to violence when confronted with state repression. Instead, they tend to seek alternative solutions, reflecting a greater diversity in their responses (Croson and Gneezy 2009). This diversity explains why women often display

resourcefulness and creativity in exploring nonviolent tactics and garnering support (Codur and King 2015; Pérez-Rosario 2018; Nikolayenko and DeCasper 2018).

In this context, I argue that women tend to respond to state repression without resorting to aggressive behaviors. Instead, they are motivated to develop innovative nonviolent strategies. For instance, female organizers in Poland orchestrated a two-day protest called the Queue for Freedom. This creative approach was employed to defend their reproductive rights during a pandemic (Mobilisation Lab 2020). During this protest, participants deliberately formed long queues at a grocery store near Parliament as a peaceful means of expressing their discontent. This protest earned the moniker 'grocery strike,' and to some extent, this approach is exclusive to women, as they are often the ones responsible for grocery shopping in society.

Such creativity helps expand nonviolent repertoires and mitigates the likelihood of resorting to violence. Several instances illustrate this point. During the Shaheen Bagh protest, female demonstrators, in addition to their other protest activities, established three smaller tents, seven of which remained operational throughout the day and evenings. These tents included a legal tent, a protest library, and a medical tent (Chopra 2021). One particularly innovative feature was the protest library (Financial Express 2020). From the outset of the movement, a couple of students from New Delhi's Jamia Millia Islamia University brought a few books and blankets to the pavement outside the campus and set up the country's first public protest library known as 'We Read, We Lead' (Chopra 2021).

Building on the earlier argument that women are more likely to manage conflicts peacefully, it is reasonable to assume that if a social movement is primarily composed of women and encounters a conflict with the government or its security apparatus, they may be less inclined to resort to violence compared to a male-dominated movement. However, an important aspect of this aforementioned discussion is how a movement with more women could impact the situation. To address this question, I will provide further discussion and examination in the robustness check and alternative mechanisms sections.

4.3.5 Why male counterparts follow?

The second interaction that influences women's tactics when challenging the government involves their interactions with men. Exploring the motivations and roles of male counterparts in

anti-government campaigns is crucial for understanding the dynamics within such movements.

When examining the effect of increased female participation on the actions of male counterparts, it becomes evident that the reputational cost for men to engage in violence is higher when they openly oppose the peaceful mobilization advocated by women and attempt to drive them away.

While this might appear contradictory to the argument focused on social behaviors within a patriarchal society, it's vital to acknowledge the significant efforts made to highlight the importance of gender equality. While patriarchal traditions have not been fully reformed, there has been a noticeable shift in attitudes towards gender equality in recent years. This shift indicates an increasing recognition of the importance of women's perspectives and leadership (Barnhart et al. 2020). In this changing landscape, male counterparts who act as respectful followers and peaceful guardians of female participants contribute to creating positive narratives around the campaign. Such actions also send strong signals to external audiences, emphasizing the inclusive nature of the movement.

Another reason why women's preference matter is that we have known that the tactical choice of non-state challengers could affect the public perception, and support of their causes (Huff and Kruszewska 2016). The success of an anti-government movement often hinges on its ability to garner greater public support, which in turn increases pressure on the state authority to make concessions (Muñoz and Anduiza 2019; Wasow 2020). Moreover, in a global context where gender equality and the acceptance of women's viewpoints are increasingly emphasized, the presence of women changes the cost-and-benefit calculation for men The combination of societal expectations and international norms places double pressure on male counterparts to accept the standpoints put forth by women and girls. They are compelled to consider the potential reputation costs associated with opposing the peaceful mobilization claims advocated by female participants, as doing so could lead to backlash and a loss of public support. Consequently, the influence of these dual pressures reinforces the acceptance of women's perspectives and strengthens the collective stance of the movement as a whole.

In summary, understanding the motivations and roles of male counterparts in anti-government campaigns is crucial. The presence of more female participants within such movements alters

the dynamics and decision-making processes for male non-state challengers. The combination of reputation costs, changing attitudes towards gender equality, and the influence of external norms creates an environment where male counterparts are more likely to accept the viewpoints and calls for peaceful mobilization from women and girls.

Overall, these qualities suggest that female participation is more likely to guide anti-government movements towards civil resistance. To sum up, the discussion above has led to a testable hypothesis, which I have summarized below:

Hypothesis 4.1: The civil movements with more female participants are less likely to use violence.

4.4 Research Design

To test my expectation, I focus on violent and nonviolent maximalist resistance campaigns worldwide between 1945 and 2014, as recorded in the NAVCO 2.1 dataset (Chenoweth and Shay 2022).

The unit of observation is the campaign-year. This decision was made because we occasionally observe that certain movements alter their primary tactics over time, and their actions against the incumbent government can potentially escalate or de-escalate. For instance, founded in 1962, FRELIMO began as a nationalist movement fighting for the self-determination and independence of Mozambique. It initiated an armed campaign against Portuguese colonial rule during the 1960s and 1970s. FRELIMO also established the Women's Detachment, a part of the Department of Defense, to encourage the mobilization of women and expand FRELIMO's support. Women cadres were seen as a new and decisive force in the revolutionary struggle (Disney 2008). Therefore, at the beginning of this fight, they initially chose civil resistance but quickly transitioned to violence and committed great atrocities (Ciment 2015). FRELIMO is one of many instances where such trends, patterns, and transformations might not be apparent when considering only campaign-level data. Instead, using the campaign-year as the unit of analysis could help this paper capture this temporal variation and provide a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics between violent and nonviolent tactics.

4.4.1 Outcome variable

Table 4.1 offers a contingency table highlighting the relationship between binary measures of protest violence and female participation across events. The primary resistance method employed in a campaign year serves as the outcome variable for the test. It's binary-coded: 1 signifies campaigns that are mainly nonviolent, and 0 denotes those that are primarily violent (Chenoweth and Shay 2022).

Table 4.1: **Contingency table: nonviolent events and greater female presence**

	Nonviolent Tactics	
Event with Greater Female Presence	No	Yes
No	40	1
Yes	128	169

4.4.2 Independent variables

To measure whether women are actively engaged in frontline confrontation with the government, I initially use the *Frontline Role* variable as the primary independent variable. It is coded as 1 if there are reports of women significantly protesting or actively combating the government, and 0 if there is no clear evidence. This variable serves as a proxy to replace measuring the exact number of female participants, as such data might introduce the risk of under- or over-reporting bias. Overall, 297 out of 338 campaigns feature women as significant components.

I also utilize information on the extent of women's frontline participation as the second explanatory variable. This variable is ordinal, ranging from 0 to 3, with higher values indicating a larger percentage of observed participants being women. Detailed coding information about these variables is included in Appendix A.

4.4.3 Control variables

I include a set of control variables that could potentially impact female participation and have been introduced to mitigate the influence of confounding factors. The first set of control variables operates at the campaign level, one of which is controlling for the state's reaction to campaign activity in the previous year. There is an ongoing debate on whether state brutality will backfire or not (Kurtz and Smithey 2018). It is widely acknowledged that the counter-

productive effects of state brutality are contingent on various factors (Wasow 2020; Manekin and Mitts 2022; Thaler, Mueller, and Mosinger 2023). At the very least, these studies have confirmed that prior responses by the state authorities directly influence the decisions made by dissidents regarding their next steps. NAVCO 2.1 has documented the degree of state repression in response to campaign activity on a scale ranging from 0 (no repression) to 3 (extreme repression).

In addition, I include an indicator of the general size of the campaign in a year. It is ordinal, ranging from 0 to 4. The higher in number suggest a larger campaign size. Previous findings suggest that the larger campaigns could be more capable to pressure the government to compromise (Butcher and Pinckney 2022), and in turn, it would affect the cost-benefit considerations for participants. It is also taken from the NAVCO 2.1 (Chenoweth and Shay 2022).

I introduce country contextual factors. The regime type of a country is first taken into account. I use participatory democracy to capture, as several studies (e.g., Carey 2006; Berman 2021) have shown that the risks of state and protester violence are both related to whether the citizens could have appropriate channels to voice their concerns and grievances. This participatory democracy index is a proxy for active participation by citizens in all political processes. It ranges from 0 to 1, where higher levels indicate more liberal democracy. Then I also use the political civil liberties index that reflect government repression history. It ranges from 0 to 1, indicating from low to high. The variable is particularly related to the likelihood of state repressive response and individual expectations of potential threats. These two variables above are drawn from V-dem Data (Coppedge et al. 2019). Additionally, I also control for the ethnic fractionalization in a country year. Thurber (2018) argues that ethnic and social structures would affect on whether dissidents start nonviolent campaigns or not. The constraints on politically excluded ethnic minorities prevent or deter them from getting a civil resistance campaign off the ground (Thurber 2018). Therefore, I utilize the historic index of ethnic fractionalization from Dražanová (2020) to control the time-variant ethnic heterogeneity. This index corresponds to the probability that two randomly drawn individuals within a country are not from the same ethnic group and calculated based on the annual percentage of ethnic groups in each country. It continuously ranges from 0 to 1 and the higher in number suggests more ethnically hetero-

geneous. Given that this HIEF dataset only provides information until 2013, I take the average values of previous five years to fill in the values of 2014.

I also argue if women's participation in civil resistance is valued and their influence is acknowledged, they are more likely to prevent violence and contribute to peaceful outcomes. Like due to the backlash from male fighters, the presence of female combatants also results in lower unit cohesion, thus decreasing rebel combat effectiveness (Mehrl 2022). Haider and Loureiro (2021) interview the female leaders in the protests against Hazara killings in Pakistan, and find women inside the movements cannot influence the decision-making process due to the patriarchal barriers and norms. Tracing the movement trajectory of Hazara protests, greater female presence and organizing peaceful small women groups, ease not erase, the violent nature of this campaign. However, their leader roles are discouraged or discredited, and women are 'sanctioned' for their contribution as the male relatives would name them 'beysar'[5](Haider and Loureiro 2021). Hence, we could witness sporadic violent episodes like burning public property, conducted by male counterparts. In light of that, I argue that even if women actively engage in civil resistance campaigns, they will be more likely to be shadowed by other male members or leaders. On the contrary, when the presence of female protesters is valued, they are more likely to exert influence on the campaign as a whole and maximize their effect. Therefore, I add *Women Empowerment Index* to control such influence.

In addition to the previously mentioned variables, I have included two more variables that specifically capture the prevailing gender norms within the movement. The variable *Gender Inclusive Ideology* assesses whether a part of the movement explicitly advocates for the inclusion of women in public life or not (Chenoweth 2019). This variable helps us understand the movement's stance on gender equality and its commitment to promoting women's participation and empowerment. The second variable, *Gender Inclusion Demand*, measures whether women's issues, such as ensuring women's full citizenship in political life, are prominently featured as top demands of the entire movement (Chenoweth 2019). This variable highlights the movement's recognition of the importance of addressing gender inequalities and promoting gender-inclusive agendas. By incorporating these variables, we can better capture the influence of gender norms

5. A women who loves staying out of house

on the representation and participation of women within the movement. Examining these norms allows us to assess whether women are included and heard in the decision-making processes (Schaftenaar 2017). By controlling for that, we can account for the extent to which women's voices are valued and integrated into the movement's activities. Furthermore, considering gender norms helps us evaluate the potential dynamics between male and female participants, including whether male counterparts respect and support the peaceful mobilization of female protesters.

4.5 Empirical analysis

I now empirically test how having more female participants could influence the likelihood of using nonviolent tactics. Table 4.2 provides estimates of using the binary measure, *Female Participation* for four models. Model 1 is the baseline model. Model 2 to 4 incorporates the controls. In Model 3, I include year fixed effects and standard errors are robustly clustered at the country and year level to take into consideration the non-independence between campaigns that exist in the same state. In Model 4, I add a interaction term between *Female Participation* and *State Reaction* to see whether my argument around women is less likely to use violence in response to state's use of forces holds true.

In Models 1 to 3, a significant positive correlation is observed between having more female participants and the use of civil resistance tactics. To contextualize these effects, I calculated predicted probabilities using Model 3 from Table 4.2. On average, the predicted probability increases by around 20 percentage points, which is substantively significant. To further test my theoretical expectations, I use the continuous and ordinal measurements of the extent of female participation as independent variable and present the results in Table 4.3. The estimates of *Extent of Female Participation* remain positive and significant across Models 5 to 7, providing further support for my previous findings, indicating that events with significant female participation are more likely to follow the civil resistance pathway when advancing their agendas and fighting against the government.

To better visualize the magnitude implied by my findings, Figure 4.1 illustrates the predicted probability of employing nonviolent tactics based on the two primary independent variables,

Table 4.2: **Determinants of using nonviolent tactics by female participation**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Female Participation	1.23^{***}	1.19^{***}	1.27^{***}	-19.44^{***}
	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.35)	(0.70)
Democracy Index		-3.56^{***}	-3.65^{*}	-3.67^{*}
		(0.64)	(1.53)	(1.53)
Human Right Abuse History		0.80^{*}	0.78	0.80
		(0.32)	(0.68)	(0.69)
State Reaction		-0.46^{***}	-0.51^{**}	-7.49^{***}
		(0.08)	(0.17)	(0.34)
Campaign Size		0.62^{***}	0.73^{***}	0.72^{***}
		(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Ethnic Fraction Index		-1.08^{***}	-1.09^{*}	-1.10^{*}
		(0.18)	(0.47)	(0.48)
Women Empowerment Index		2.71^{***}	2.23^{*}	2.24^{*}
		(0.35)	(0.92)	(0.92)
Gender Inclusive Ideology		0.53^{***}	0.51	0.51
		(0.10)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Gender Inclusion Demand		-0.65^{***}	-0.62^{*}	-0.62^{*}
		(0.14)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Female Participation $\times$ State Reaction				6.99^{***}
				(0.36)
Num. obs.	2050	1407	1357	1357
Log Likelihood	-1094.70	-482.67	-417.38	-414.38

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

All models use probit models. Control variables are first introduced in Model 2. In Model 3 and Model 4, in addition to control variables, I incorporate year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at both the campaign and year levels.

with all other variables held constant. Again, in alignment with my hypothesis, both graphs indicate an increasing likelihood of opting for nonviolent tactics as the main approach of a movement.

For further robustness checks on my findings, I employ an alternative sample: protest events in Africa from the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) (Salehyan et al. 2012). The outcomes, considering violence in protests and the participation of women and girls in protest events as the dependent and independent variables respectively, are significant and negative. This lends further support to my hypotheses. The regression results can be found in Appendix B.

In addition, the coefficients associated with the *State Reaction* are negative and statistically significant in all models, suggesting using violence against the non-state challengers from the state authority in the year before make a primarily nonviolent campaign more likely change

Table 4.3: **Determinants of using nonviolent tactics by the extent of female participation**

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Extent of Female Participation	0.46^{***}	0.63^{**}	0.56^{*}	-0.69
	(0.05)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.87)
Democracy Index		-3.59^{*}	-3.66^{*}	-3.75^{*}
		(1.57)	(1.55)	(1.59)
Human Right Abuse History		0.77	0.72	0.68
		(0.52)	(0.65)	(0.65)
State Reaction		-0.51^{*}	-0.55^{**}	-1.09^{**}
		(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.38)
Campaign Size		0.65^{***}	0.75^{***}	0.77^{***}
		(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Ethnic Fraction Index		-0.92^{*}	-0.90^{*}	-0.90^{*}
		(0.42)	(0.45)	(0.46)
Women Empowerment Index		2.77^{***}	2.41^{*}	2.52^{**}
		(0.83)	(0.94)	(0.93)
Gender Inclusive Ideology		0.46	0.46	0.45
		(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Gender Inclusion Demand		-0.88^{**}	-0.85^{**}	-0.84^{**}
		(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.30)
Extent of Female Participation × State Reaction				0.44
				(0.30)
Num. obs.	2050	1407	1357	1357
Log Likelihood	-1090.02	-470.10	-413.15	-409.98

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

All models use probit models. Control variables are first introduced in Model 5.
In Model 6 and Model 7, in addition to control variables, I incorporate year
fixed effects and cluster standard errors at both the campaign and year levels.

into violent.

However, when interpreting the interaction terms between the two independent variables and the state's reaction, I find that the negative impact is moderated by the level of female participation. For better visualization, I have included Figure 4.2. The results support my argument in Section 4.3.4, *Gender Gaps in Responses to State Violence*, suggesting that women are less likely to respond violently when confronted with the state's use of force. The interaction plot suggests that when state repression reaches its highest level (level 3), increased female participation significantly raises the probability of using civil resistance methods. Conversely, when there is no repression (at level 0), we even observe a negative slope. Overall, this suggests that women are more likely to peacefully confront state authority when the state is aggressive, thus further supporting my theoretical assumptions.

Democracy Level is statistically significant and negative related to choosing nonviolent path-

Figure 4.1: **Predicted probability of choosing nonviolent resistance**



Note: The dots and lines, as well as the shaded gray areas, represent predicted probabilities and their corresponding 95% confidence intervals. These probabilities are calculated based on the results from Model 3 in Table 4.2 and Model 7 in Table 4.3.

way, which is interesting. The results also confirm the finding from Thurber (2018): indeed, the ethnic fraction is negatively correlated with opening pathway of civil resistance. The coefficient of *Women Empowerment Index* supports the notion that societies with higher levels of gender equality are more likely to experience lower levels of violence and conflict (Caprioli 2005; Schaftenaar 2017; Cohen and Karim 2022). Firstly, gender equality promotes more inclusive and participatory decision-making processes, allowing diverse perspectives to be heard and considered. This inclusive approach reduces the likelihood of marginalization and grievances that can fuel violence. Secondly, gender equality fosters social norms and values that prioritize cooperation, empathy, and nonviolent conflict resolution, creating a more peaceful social environment. Additionally, empowering women and promoting their equal participation in society enhances the overall well-being and stability of communities, as women's empowerment is linked to improved education, healthcare, and economic opportunities, all of which contribute to social harmony and reduced tensions. Finally, societies with higher gender equality tend to have stronger institutions and governance structures that uphold the rule of law and promote justice, mitigating the likelihood of violent conflicts.

Last but not least, the *Campaign Size* shows a positive effect on using civil resistance tactics. It could be explained as the following reasons. First, large events often attract a diverse range

Figure 4.2: **Predicted probability of using nonviolent tactics by female participation and state reaction**



Notes: The lines, along with the shaded gray areas in the plot, represent predicted probabilities and their corresponding 95% confidence intervals. These probabilities are calculated based on the interaction term within Model 8, as presented in Table 4.3. In the legend label, 0 corresponds to no repression, and 3 corresponds to extreme repression.

of individuals with varying motivations and interests. This diversity can increase the chances of conflicting ideologies, competing goals, and tensions among participants, which can escalate into violence if not properly addressed or mediated. Second, the presence of a large crowd can create a sense of collective excitement or emotional intensity, which can be contagious and influence individual behavior. In some cases, this heightened emotional state can lead to impulsive or irrational actions, including violence. And the capability to mobilize people can influence a leader's decision to choose violent tactics against the government. When leaders have a higher capacity to mobilize a significant number of people, they may perceive themselves as having a stronger support base and a greater ability to challenge the government's authority. This can enhance non-state actors' and followers' confidence in undertaking more confrontational and violent actions, as they believe they have the resources and support necessary to sustain such actions. Lastly, the visibility and media attention associated with large events can amplify the impact and consequences of any violent incidents that occur. This can further escalate tensions and potentially attract individuals seeking confrontation or seeking to make a statement through violent means. However, it is important to note that confirming the relationship between camp size and civil peace requires more in-depth argumentation and rigorous examination. Additional research and analysis are needed to fully understand and validate

this relationship.

4.6 Alternative explanations

To further validate my findings, I consider alternative explanations. Critics may argue that my theory is too simplistic. Recent gender literature suggests that it may not be merely because women tend to be peaceful due to internalized social norms; rather, gender-equal attitudes may explain peaceful behaviors (Bjarnegård and Melander 2017). This perspective posits that men "could value freedom and equality and embrace tolerance and respect for the rights of the individual" (Bjarnegård and Melander 2017, 481). Wood and Ramirez (2018) further examines the effect of gender egalitarianism on support for the use of force to achieve foreign policy objectives. They argue that possessing progressive gender attitudes often develops alongside a broader set of worldviews and behaviors associated with men adopting nontraditional, feminine roles. This change might result in individuals being less likely to have hostile attitudes toward opponents and rivals, ultimately reducing support for violent conflicts.

Therefore, the alternative mechanism could be that it's not merely the presence of women but advocating a gender-inclusive ideology that makes a movement less likely to choose violent tactics.

Table 4.4: **Contingency table for gender inclusive ideology and women on the frontline**

	Gender Inclusive Ideology	
Women at Frontline	No	Yes
No	39	2
Yes	179	118

To test this alternative explanation, I selected two of the aforementioned control variables, *Gender Inclusive Ideology* and *Gender Inclusion Demand*, to measure the extent to which the maximalist movement embraces progressive gender relations. As shown in Table 4.4, it is evident that gender-inclusive norms and the active participation of women on the frontlines are not necessarily overlapping. For example, the Congolese National Liberation Front (FLNC) emerged in the late 1960s under the leadership of Nathaniel Mbumba as a Marxist-Leninist rebel group. Notably, the FLNC made two attempts to invade Katanga Province, later renamed

Table 4.5: **Gender open attitude and civil resistance**

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Gender Inclusive Ideology	0.34^{***}	0.43		
	(0.06)	(0.26)		
Gender Inclusion Demand			-0.28^{***}	-0.32
			(0.08)	(0.29)
Democracy Index		-3.03^{*}		-2.24
		(1.51)		(1.25)
Repression History		0.42		0.16
		(0.66)		(0.65)
State Reaction		-0.56^{**}		-0.57^{***}
		(0.17)		(0.17)
Campaign Size		0.75^{***}		0.76^{***}
		(0.13)		(0.13)
Ethnic Fraction Index		-1.00^{*}		-0.88
		(0.49)		(0.48)
Women Empowerment Index		2.23^{*}		1.97^{*}
		(0.97)		(0.87)
Num. obs.	2050	1357	2050	1357
Log Likelihood	-1116.12	-437.79	-1125.13	-443.89

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Shaba, in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in 1977 and 1978, with the aim of overthrowing the government of Mobutu Sese Seko. It is worth noting that the FLNC's leadership and frontline positions were predominantly occupied by men, with limited representation of women. However, the FLNC publicly declared that their movement or struggle aimed to liberate women, highlighting a positive gender ideology within their anti-government campaigns (Thomas, 2015). Therefore, it is worth to differentiate the underlying mechanism.

The findings from the analysis, as reported in Table 4.5, indicate that there is no consistent relationship (either positive or negative) between open gender attitudes and the likelihood of using nonviolent tactics. This suggests that open gender attitudes alone may not be a determining factor in the choice of nonviolent tactics in the context studied.

4.7 Case study

Another limitation of this paper lies in the fact that certain assumptions forming the theories cannot be empirically tested, due to the constraints imposed by relying on the large-N quanti-

tative study with limited observational data. How can we effectively examine whether women expand their traditional social roles to the context of social movements? In response to this limitation, I present a case study focused on anti-government protests in Cote d'Ivoire between 2010 to 2011. This case study serves as a valuable illustration, shedding light on the tangible ways in which female protesters actively contribute to the pursuit of peace within the realm of anti-government campaigns. It underscores the pivotal role that women can play in effecting positive change across various facets of contentious politics. By delving into the specific dynamics of the Cote d'Ivoire protests, this section aims to bridge the gap left by limited observational data, thereby enriching our understanding of the multifaceted roles women assume within social movements and their capacity to influence these movements positively.

In the historical context of Cote d'Ivoire, the political, social, and cultural landscape has long been characterized by male dominance and a patriarchal structure. This perspective was articulated by President Felix Houphouet-Boigny in 1975 when he stated (Toungara 2022), "This is why Ivorian women have a greater ambition to prove themselves intellectually and professionally while still fulfilling their roles as wives and mothers." This statement underscores the enduring social expectations that define what is considered "appropriate" behavior for Ivorian women and girls. As of 2019, the Gender Parity Score (GPS) for Africa averaged at 0.58, while in Cote d'Ivoire, it stood at 0.53. [6] In an effort to address gender disparities, the government passed a law in 2019, requiring political parties to include female candidates comprising 30% of their parliamentary election rosters (Richard 2021).

However, similar to their African neighbors, the impact of civil wars created a unique opportunity for women to assert themselves within their families, communities, and society as a whole.

During the first civil war, as the security situation deteriorated, women were initially invited to join the dozos, a group of traditional hunters that had evolved into a specialized national force (Bado and Kendhammer, n.d.). The roles that women assumed within the dozos still mirrored their roles in families. While some were allowed to carry arms, it was primarily for defensive

6. The Gender Parity Score (GPS) assigns equal weight to each indicator and computes an aggregate measure at the country level, signifying the proximity of women to achieving gender parity. A GPS of 1.00 symbolizes parity, while a GPS of 0.95 suggests that a country is 5 percent away from reaching parity. In Africa, the average GPS was recorded at 0.58, pointing to significant gender inequality: Data source: Statista.

purposes. Their main responsibilities involved organizing, hiring, and overseeing management roles (Bado and Kendhammer, n.d.). In a way, they were running these groups much like they managed their households, mainly responsible for keeping the organization running and members of the groups networked.

This narrative paints a clear picture of the historical context in Cote d'Ivoire, the traditional gender roles, and the evolving roles of women during times of conflict. It conveys a convincing story of women's adaptation and empowerment in the face of challenging circumstances, although this empowerment is often channeled through a gendered, female-focused approach. In many ways, it is evident that years of concerted efforts have resulted in some progress. However, deeply ingrained patriarchal norms and practices continue to present challenges to achieving gender parity in Cote d'Ivoire. Consequently, women are leveraging their gender roles to attain greater political and social impact within their traditional communities.

Similarly, women in Cote d'Ivoire have actively engaged in politics, spearheading limited yet impactful social movements. The Women's March on Grand-Bassam in 1949, marked by significant female participation, protested against the French colonial rulers (Jacob 2022). Subsequently, women also played a crucial role in anti-war protests during the Ivorian civil wars (Baalen 2023).

To illustrate my theory more effectively, I will focus on women-led protests in Cote d'Ivoire in 2011. A political crisis unfolded in Cote d'Ivoire when President Laurent Gbagbo declined to recognize the election victory of Alassane Ouattara in 2010, an event commonly referred to as the 2010-2011 Ivorian crisis. This political turmoil came to an end when Gbagbo was arrested by pro-Ouattara forces with the backing of French forces. Throughout this crisis, there were numerous clashes between supporters of the two opposing parties.

Amid these resistance efforts, female activists organized several protests, opposing the human rights abuses committed by President Gbagbo. Their actions echoed the longstanding West African social institution of public motherhood, where "women's status as mothers authorized their moral interventions into community life" (Jacob 2022, 2). Female protesters in Cote d'Ivoire once again underscored these unique facets of women's activism.

On March 3, 2011, 15,000 women, dressed in black, some adorned with leaves or standing

in their nakedness, assembled peacefully in Abidjan. However, during this demonstration, the police attempted to disband the women's march using heavy artillery (Nossiter 2011). Reacting to the government's aggression, a larger protest was organized. On International Women's Day, just a few days later in 2011, approximately 45,000 women gathered peacefully in Abobo, a suburb of Abidjan (Smith 2011a).

Despite facing violence from security forces, the renewed protest on March 8th stood firm. Instead of retaliating with violence, the women mobilized in even greater numbers, chanting "Don't shoot us" (Smith 2011b). Holding items symbolic of gendered roles and non-threatening in nature, such as buckets, pestles, brooms, and calabashes, these women, joined by their sisters from Attécoubé, marched from the Ran crossroads to the Town Hall. Unlike male protesters who often use bricks and stones, women's use of housework-associated tools emphasized their peaceful intent. Their chants, like "the women of Cote d'Ivoire say no to killing" (Abidjan 2011), echoed a call for peace.

In stark contrast, the majority of anti-government protests in Ivory Coast tend to turn violent. Similar to the anti-president protests in 2010 and 2011, a series of massive anti-government pro-democracy street protests and demonstrations took place in 2020 following the re-run of President Alassane Ouattara's election for his third term. The 2020 Ivorian protests were triggered by similar grievances and evolved into a sequence of street protests and civil disorder. However, there was a notable absence of women, and the protests were characterized by widespread rioting and increasingly violent street demonstrations that swept across Ivory Coast (France 24 2020).

To summarize the analysis of protests with significant female participation in Ivory Coast, the findings do not directly test but rather corroborate my results and provide evidence for some less testable mechanisms. For instance, it suggests that women might extend their socially constructed roles within the household into the political movement. They are trustworthy, supportive, and adept at maintaining close connections among group members. Additionally, they may be inclined to reinforce peaceful resistance in the face of state violence.

4.8 Conclusion

This paper examines gender dynamics in anti-government campaigns. Drawing from theories of social behavior and gender expectations, it empirically tests the impact of female participation on both nonviolent and violent campaigns. While the study acknowledges the diversity of gender roles and individual preferences across countries and cultural backgrounds, it posits that women generally favor civil tactics over violent ones. Furthermore, women have consistently demonstrated creativity and leadership in nonviolent campaigns. Such qualities, derived from societal expectations and their unique roles, potentially contribute to the promotion of peace among protesters. Moreover, women are less inclined to retaliate with violence. Even in the face of severe state repression, they often strengthen their commitment rather than resorting to violence. Both statistical analyses and case studies in the paper support these assertions.

As for the policy implication for social activities, protest violence has been a pervasive and persistent problem throughout the history of social movements. Sometimes, it could consume public support for movement agendas. While male participation in protests has been well documented, the role of women in these events is often overlooked. However, women have played a critical role in civil resistance campaigns, often taking the lead in nonviolent movements and advocating for social justice and equality. Despite this, women have also been the targets of violence and discrimination, both during and after protests. The persistence of protest violence and the ongoing struggle for gender equality highlights the need for greater awareness of the challenges faced by women and the importance of their participation in shaping the future. Addressing violence and promoting gender equality are essential for sustaining a peaceful “fight”.

While this paper argues for the positive effect of the number of female participants on anti-government movements, it is important to acknowledge that the analysis is based on a sample of maximalist campaigns. The focus on maximalist campaigns, due to the data availability, still provides valuable insights into the relationship between female participation and resistance tactics in those specific contexts. However, it is essential to recognize this limitation.

It is crucial to acknowledge and address the potential presence of reversed causality when examining the relationship between women’s participation and peaceful mobilization. Specifically, it is important to consider the possibility that when a group of men becomes violent,

women may choose to withdraw from active involvement in mobilization efforts due to legitimate safety concerns. This withdrawal, in turn, may create a correlation between the level of women's participation and the probability of nonviolent approaches.

By recognizing this limitation open revenues for future investigations, researchers can work towards disentangling the complex relationships between women, men, violence, and peace. This requires a nuanced understanding of the factors that influence women's decision-making processes in conflict situations, including their perceptions of safety, their social roles and responsibilities, and the prevailing gender dynamics within their communities. By taking these factors into account and conducting rigorous research, scholars can advance our knowledge of the intricate relationships between women, men, violence, and peace. This understanding can inform the development of strategies and interventions that promote gender-inclusive and peaceful mobilization efforts in conflict and post-conflict settings.

4.9 Appendix 4A: WiRe codebook

In this section, I have included the details of gender-related measurement in WiRe dataset (Chenoweth 2019) to facilitate understanding of these variables in Table 4.6.

4.10 Appendix 4B: Robustness checks

To assess the robustness of my findings, I conducted further testing using the SCAD dataset. It should be noted that there are slight differences in the operationalization of key concepts between the SCAD dataset and NAVCO, particularly regarding the independent variable. In the SCAD dataset, this variable indicates whether women and girls played a significant role in the protest event. It is coded as 1 if: a) the main actors in the event are organized based on female gender identity, b) the targets of the event are explicitly female, or c) the motivating issue revolves around matters specific to women. Conversely, it is coded as 0 if women did not play significant roles.

Given the lack of a database that records the exact number of female protesters, this variable acts as an appropriate proxy; events that meet the criteria are anticipated to have higher female participation. Within the dataset, 173 protest events feature women in significant roles,

Table 4.6: **Women in resistance (WiRe) dataset codebook**

Variable Name	Variable	Definition 3	Clarification
frontlinerole	Women in Frontline Roles (0=no; 1=yes)?	Women reported / observed in combat roles or on frontlines of peak demonstrations, protests, or nonviolent events (1) or not (0)	To qualify as a 1, must be reports of women actively involved in frontline confrontation against opponent personnel (either violently or nonviolently).
extentfrontrole	Extent Women in Frontline Roles (0=none; 1=limited; 2=moderate; 3=extensive; -99 ambiguous/unknown)	Extent of women's frontline participation.	A code of 0 for this variable must match a code of 0 for the "Women in Frontline Roles" variable.
wmissues	Womens' Issues Central to Campaign Demands (0=no; 1=yes)?	Womens' issues featured among the top 5 demands made by the movement/campaign (1) or not (0)	Code for the entire campaign, not just for women participants of the campaign.
gi_ideol	Gender-Inclusive Ideology (0=no; 1=yes; 2=contested)?	Segments of movement/campaign explicitly advocate the inclusion of women in public life or not (based on MAROB) (1) or not (0). A code of (2) suggests that the campaign is actively debating its ideology regarding gender-inclusion.	This defaults to 0 unless there are explicit mentions by movement participants that the ideology is gender-inclusive, or there are movement documents indicating as much.

constituting only 3.3% of the total data sample. This low proportion is a key reason why the SCAD dataset wasn't chosen as the primary data source for the analysis, as it could potentially underrepresent the presence of women and introduce biases to the estimates.

In total, the sample for the robustness check covers 46 African countries from 2000 to 2017, using the SCAD dataset as the primary data source. Moreover, I selected the country-year as the unit of analysis and included a set of control variables similar to those in the main analysis.

The results are presented in Table 4.7. In Model 2 in Table 4.7, consistent with expectations, an additional protest event in which women play important roles is associated with a decrease of 0.2 points in the number of violent protests. To provide further context to these effects, I calculated predicted values. On average, if there were five more protest events that were more gender-inclusive, there could be an anticipated decrease of one unit in the number of violent protests. This finding holds substantive significance.

This suggests that as the number of events with prominent female participation increases, there is a corresponding decrease in the likelihood of violent outcomes. By leveraging the SCAD dataset and its specific conceptualisation of variables, the validity and reliability of my findings are enhanced. These results hold true across different operationalization of key variables and are consistent even in a smaller sample size.

Table 4.7: **Regression results predicting the number of violent protest**

	OLS	*panel linear*
	Model 1	Model 2
Female Event	−0.242 ***	−0.204**
	(0.086)	(0.087)
Event Count	−0.092***	−0.098***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Urban Events	0.228***	0.238***
	(0.044)	(0.044)
Organized Events	−0.089***	−0.094***
	(0.044)	(0.044)
GDP(log)	0.028	0.030
	(0.075)	(0.088)
Population (log)	0.129 *	0.122
	(0.066)	(0.077)
Women Empower Index	−0.011	−0.078
	(0.637)	(0.720)
Participatory Democracy Index	0.165	0.284
	(1.095)	(1.227)
Repression on Civil Society	0.003	0.284
	(1.095)	(1.227)
Constant	−1.945	−1.829
	(1.264)	(1.464)
Observations	724	724
R^2	0.119	0.1111
Adjusted R^2	0.108	0.1
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The three preceding chapters have both theoretically studied and empirically tested different theories around the violence in civil resistance. While Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 examined the impact and origins of protests violence, Chapter 4 went on by clarifying whether female protesters could contribute to maintaining peace in social movements.

Some findings are worth summarising again. First, in Chapter 2, I find attacking government-related targets and attacking people would render the repressive reaction from the state authority more likely.

Chapter 3 focuses on the participants and their diverse attributes, adding depth to our understanding of nonviolent contention. It is important to recognize that individual identity is fluid and can manifest differently depending on the context. People may choose to participate in various protests using different identities. For example, one may join as a member of a trade union in some cases, while in other instances, they may participate as an individual dissenting voice driven by personal beliefs in global change.

Therefore, the actor typology can be seen as a compilation of grievances and mobilization motivations. It reflects how individuals choose to align themselves with different identities and causes based on the specific context and their motivations for participation. This nuanced perspective allows us to better comprehend the multifaceted nature of civil resistance and the varied roles that participants play within it.

Based on these assumptions, the empirical tests in Chapter 3 provide evidence that different actors have different effects on the risks of using violence, which are linked to the attributes of the actor type, mobilization experience, and whether the movement is formally organized.

We can draw inferences, such as groups that regularly meet and discuss plans and the future of the movement are more likely to filter out uncertain or risky elements in their campaigns. Comparative case studies of the April 6 Youth Movement in Egypt and the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia further support this argument. Meanwhile, individuals with specific features, such as a young age or belonging to an ethnic minority, may face a higher risk of violent outbreaks compared to general dissidents.

Chapter 4 explores the gender dynamics within violence and civil resistance, providing empirical evidence that increasing the participation of women in social movements can yield peaceful and positive outcomes.

5.1 Academic contribution and policy implications

The main implications of Chapter 2 are rooted in a substantial body of literature that has proposed the idea that, albeit not universally recommended, violent protests can sometimes serve as a potent tool for advancing the goals of a social or political movement. Consequently, it becomes imperative for protesters to adopt a more strategic approach when organizing and selecting their targets. This strategy should strike a delicate equilibrium between garnering increased government attention and minimizing the risk of exacerbating an already tense situation.

Moreover, the selection of violence as a means of protest must be a calculated decision, taking into account the need to sustain public support. In fact, several studies have highlighted the delicate balance between the use of violence and maintaining the backing of the broader public. In this context, the protesters find themselves in a complex situation, where they must carefully evaluate the potential benefits of resorting to violence while safeguarding their movement's long-term viability and legitimacy.

In total, Chapter 2 underscores the significance of thoughtful and strategic decision-making within the realm of protest movements. It emphasizes the importance of choosing the right tactics, targets, and timing to effectively advocate for change while navigating the nuanced dynamics of public perception and government response. This nuanced approach could be pivotal in achieving the desired outcomes of a social or political movement, making it a critical topic for further exploration and analysis.

A key takeaway from Chapter 3 for social activists is the importance of offering training, education, and opportunities for gatherings when aiming to peacefully advocate for social and political change. Embracing nonviolence is crucial, as resorting to violence can diminish future opportunities and support for the movement and can divert media attention from the core issues. In the digital age, while communication costs have decreased for mobilizing large numbers of people, challenges arise in developing strong commitment and agency. By emphasizing the significance of their cause and the discipline of nonviolence, activists can instill a sense of calm and unwavering determination in their followers, ensuring their sustained commitment to driving change peacefully.

An insight gleaned from the findings presented in Chapter 4 underscores the vital significance of actively promoting increased women's participation in social movements. This imperative, however, is not without its challenges, as encouraging greater participation demands a multifaceted effort.

One notable obstacle lies in the observed reluctance of some women and girls to join these movements. This reluctance often stems from concerns surrounding potential societal backlash, particularly when it comes to affiliating with disruptive and violent protests. Such individuals may harbor apprehensions about their personal safety, as the prospect of chaos and riots can understandably be a deterrent to involvement.

To address this issue comprehensively, it is essential to establish support systems and safe spaces that can mitigate these fears. Providing education and awareness campaigns about the importance of women's participation in social movements, coupled with efforts to guarantee their safety, can help alleviate concerns and promote a more inclusive environment. Moreover, highlighting the diverse roles women can play in these movements beyond direct confrontation, such as organizing, advocacy, and leadership, can also make participation more appealing and accessible.

Overall, Chapter 4 underscores the need for a concerted effort to empower and engage more women in social movements. Overcoming the barriers to their participation demands a strategic and sensitive approach that takes into account their concerns and creates an environment conducive to their active involvement. In doing so, the potential for peaceful and positive impacts,

as demonstrated by empirical evidence, can be more fully realized.

5.2 Limitations and avenues for future research

Throughout my work, I was able to find empirical evidence for most of my hypotheses, but as indicated, many other avenues for further research do exist.

First, in the conclusion of Chapter 2, I discussed concerns about the validity of human-coded protest violence data obtained from news reports. Therefore, by leveraging natural-language-processing techniques or fine-tuning large language models, we could collect more precise information from the wealth of textual data related to civil resistance campaigns. The primary motivation for collecting such data arises from the significant gaps in existing protest data collections. I hope that the publication of this paper will encourage further advancements in data collection methods. Datasets like ACLED and the Carnegie Global Protest Tracker could take the initiative to pay more attention to detailed information about the attacks in violent protests, including data such as timestamps, geolocation, and the main perpetrators. Additionally, the PVTS dataset itself would be highly beneficial if it could expand its temporal scope to include social conflicts in Latin America. These efforts would substantially enhance the study of protest violence targeting, enabling researchers to comprehensively address questions concerning the factors influencing target choices.

In addition, future researchers can leverage the PVTS dataset to empirically investigate various research questions. For instance, they can delve into the conditions that lead protesters to opt for targeting government-related entities. Exploring whether the selection of these targets is a well-thought-out strategic decision or a result of spontaneous rage, where protesters choose the nearest available options, will shed light on the dynamics of civil resistance. Or researchers can examine the role of economic grievances in influencing individuals' inclination to target shops and commercial establishments during protests. By mapping out the decision-making process behind target selection, future research aims to map out the underlying logic driving protesters' choices.

Secondly, while Chapter 3 argues that the typology of actors serves as a valuable indicator to proxy for mobilization experience, it is essential to acknowledge the limitations associated

with its use. While this approach provides insights into the backgrounds and characteristics of protest participants, it may not capture the full complexity of their experiences. In the future, we could conduct more actor-oriented analyses that account for multiple actors within a movement. This approach would also involve tracking how actors emerge, evolve, or disappear over time, providing a more dynamic view of civil resistance campaigns. By examining the changing networks and interactions between these actors, we can gain a deeper understanding of mobilization experiences, the learning process between actors and movements, and their implications for protest violence. Such an approach would allow us to explore how individuals within a movement develop and dissolve connections with various actors, shedding light on the ever-evolving nature of these campaigns. These actor-oriented analyses would provide valuable insights into the factors influencing protest violence and offer a more comprehensive perspective on the dynamics within these movements. This research direction will greatly benefit from ongoing data collection efforts, allowing for a more detailed exploration of these complexities.

Third, one important aspect I aim to address in future research is the issue of reversed causality between women's participation and peace. A strong counter-argument, which Chapter 4 did not fully explore, is that women might strategically choose not to attend movements with a higher probability of violence. Consequently, we observe a positive correlation between the presence of women and peace. While the paper does provide illustrative examples to suggest otherwise, I intend to revisit this issue in the future using a more experimental setting to gain a deeper understanding of the decision-making process for women social activists.

I also view the findings in Chapter 4 as a springboard for re-examining gender dynamics within the nonviolent resistance literature. While Chapter 4 offers valuable insights into the role of female protesters in promoting peace within social movements, there remains a substantial area for further exploration. Gender dynamics in social movements have been extensively discussed from a sociological perspective but have received limited attention in the literature on civil resistance. This represents an underexplored aspect of the field, and existing research highlights the need for more comprehensive investigations.

Moving forward, we have the opportunity to delve deeper into the gendered experiences of protesters and the specific challenges and opportunities that female participants encounter

within civil resistance movements. In our research endeavors, it is crucial to provide both quantitative and qualitative evidence to comprehensively address this aspect.

Furthermore, an examination of the responses of state authorities and the wider public to female-led civil resistance could shed light on the broader societal dynamics at play. Understanding how gender influences perceptions of protest movements and their goals is essential for comprehending the overall effectiveness of nonviolent resistance campaigns.

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